Sunday, 21 August 2016

The Role of The Nairobi Securities Exchange. Kenyan Capital Markets Law

What is the role of the Nairobi Stock Exchange and what role has it played in the economy of Kenya?

What is a stock exchange? A stock exchange can be basically defined as an organized market where stock, bond[1]and shares are issued, bought and sold through brokers and dealers[2]. It constitutes a part of the capital market. Institutions seeking long term funds are dominant in the stock market. Long term funds can be described as funds obtained for a time frame that exceeds one year[3]. The stock exchange is also included[4].
In a stock exchange there are new issues and second hand shares. New issues are shares that are being issued from a company that is floating its assets for the first time whereas second hand shares which constitute a larger part of the stock market are shares that have been circulating in a market for some time. They are therefore attractive to invest in especially with accurately predicted information. 
The stock market can be at a particular place but the growth of electronic transactions does not favor a centrally located physical location[5].
According to the Capital Markets Act a securities exchange is means a market, derivatives exchange, securities organization or other place at which securities are offered for sale, purchase or exchange, including any clearing or settlement, with or without novation, or transfer services connected therewith[6]’.
The Nairobi Stock Exchange was established in 1954 under the Societies Act. Previously in the 1920’s it was a European only affair. Africans were only allowed to trade in 1964[7]
Who are the key stakeholders?
1.      Investors: investors make up a fundamental part of the stakeholders. They introduce money in exchange for shares. Investors need;
Information about the market that is timely and accurate, to be relied upon or that gives a true and fair view of companies in the stock exchange.
Investment opportunities that can increase their wealth by making profits
Security, they need protection of their investments by ensuring that the issuers are not fraudulent or partake in activities that injure the investor
Investor seek for an avenue of wealth creation and given the viability of the stock exchange it is suitable
Investors need transparency of the stock exchange which would enable them to make an integral based monitoring of their activities
Investors need an arbitration avenue in the event that disputes arise and given that the courts are clogged with case backlog. This alternative dispute resolution method will enable a timely settlement.
Investors at many times are lay people who do not possess skills to predict and work the stock exchange[8] as such they need to be educated on the technical mode of operation of the stock exchange[9].
The Nairobi Stock exchange provides all the above outlined services to investors by providing an effective and efficient transparent avenue for price discovery of shares of the different listed companies and an avenue for wealth creation and management[10].
2.      Issuers
Issuers have a number of needs;
Issuers prefer a liquid market[11] as an alternative to raise money as compared to a security based bank loan. Stocks are considered liquid because they can be rapidly sold and the act of selling has little impact on the stock's price[12].
Issuers need a low cost of capital, these are funds that a business uses to run the business, issuing of shares provides this opportunity to raise low cost capital.
Issuers need a vibrant competition from potential investors on their shares. This broadens the market and thus more investors.
The Nairobi Stock exchange provides for issuers an opportunity to unlock their value, to enhance their profile in the capital market; it raises the shareholder’s value and lastly raises the governance standards[13].
3.      Media
The media are stakeholders in the stock market their needs include;
Information on the stock market and clarification on matters that are beyond common knowledge, the Nairobi Stock Exchange provides the media with accurate and timely financial information[14].
4.      Government
The government is a stakeholder in the capital market; the government also needs to raise funds for its corporations. It uses the capital markets as a barometer of the economy. It also needs a body to execute its policies. The Nairobi Stock Exchange provides the government with a platform for policy implementation and capital raising[15].
5.      Market intermediaries
These include the other people who are involved in the capital market such a guarantors, underwriter and lawyers etc. the need business opportunities, transparency and a chance to enjoy economies of scale. The Nairobi Stock Exchange provides a robust capital market infrastructure for market intermediaries to conduct their business.

How have the various roles of the Nairobi Stock Exchange described above enhanced the Kenyan economy?
The Nairobi Securities Exchange provides for an avenue of resource mobilization directly from the public, this lowers the cost of raising capital and thus more profits from less capital this has the effect of boosting the economy.
The government taxes dividends of companies and as such increases government revenue which in the long run enhances the government ability to monitor the capital markets and thus boosts the Kenyan economy.
The Nairobi Stock exchange educates investors on how to interpret financial information and thereby equipping them with key skills in trading and as such this boosts the economy by enhancing better traders that make better informed decisions that lead to more profit.
The Nairobi Stock Exchange gives room to the growth of related financial services sector e.g. insurance pension schemes, which nurture the spirit of savings. In the long run this boosts the economy by diversifying financial services.
The Nairobi Stock Exchange encourages high standards of accounting and management of resources. It also allows public disclosure that gives effective efficiency in the capital growth process and ultimately the economy as a whole[16].
The Nairobi Stock Exchange facilitates equity financing[17]. Equity financing is the method of raising capital by selling company stock[18] to investors. In return for the investment, the shareholders receive ownership interests in the company[19]. Equity financing is preferred to debt financing. Most countries, both developed and undeveloped, have been trying to do away with debt financing - especially during recessions.
The Nairobi Stock Exchange enables futuristic funding in most of the developing countries, where venture capital in mostly unavailable such as Kenya.

Bibliography
Acts
1.      Capital Markets Act
Books/Articles
2.      Rose. W. Ngugi, Development of the Nairobi Stock Exchange: A Historical Perspective, KIPPRA Discussion Paper No. 27(2003)
3.      Dr. Jacob Gakeri, ‘Regulating Kenya’s Securities Markets: An Assessment of the Capital Markets Authority’s Enforcement Jurisprudence’
4.      Aduda J et al, The Determinants of Stock Market Development: The Case for the Nairobi Stock Exchange, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 2 No. 9; May
Internet Sources



[6] Sec 2
[7] Rose. W. Ngugi, Development of the Nairobi Stock Exchange: A Historical Perspective, KIPPRA Discussion Paper No. 27(2003)
[8] Dr. Jacob Gakeri, ‘Regulating Kenya’s Securities Markets: An Assessment of the Capital Markets Authority’s
Enforcement Jurisprudence’
[9] Aduda J et al, The Determinants of Stock Market Development: The Case for the Nairobi Stock Exchange,
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 2 No. 9; May

Saturday, 20 August 2016

What is the Accuracy of the Ruling in Beiersdorf East Africa Limited v Emirchem Products(2002) in Light of the Ruling in Lords Healthcare v Salama Pharmaceuticals (2007) ? Kenyan Intellectual Property Law

A proprietor of a trademark has the exclusive use of the mark and any person who wishes to use it has to do so with a license from the protection’
-         Per Mbaluto, J. In Beiersdorf Ag v Emirchem Products Ltd. 2002 KLR 1,7.

Discuss the accuracy of this statement in the light of the ruling in Lords Healthcare v Salama Pharmaceuticals, Civil Suit 334 of 2007 (Okwengu, LJ).

Facts
Beiersdorf East Africa Ag v Emirchem Products Ltd: In the seminal ruling by Judge Mbaluto that was delivered at the Nairobi High Court, the plaintiff had been manufacturing and selling products such as soaps, toilet paper, oils for the skin etc. under the registered trademark Nivea Crème worldwide for many years. One of the plaintiff’s products was Nivea petroleum jelly was sold in a rectangular jar. On the face of it was written Nivea and immediately below were the words pure petroleum jelly.

The defendant was manufacturing and selling a product that was called Nivelin pure petroleum jelly. The plaintiff’s grievance was that the defendant’s product was so similar to the plaintiffs registered trademark that it constituted infringement and that the defendant was also liable for passing off.  The plaintiff approached the honourable high court to seek for an interlocutory injunction and was granted.

Lords Healthcare v Salama Pharmaceuticals: In the jurisprudential ruling that was delivered by Judge Okwengu at the Nairobi Milimani High Court, the plaintiff was a distributor of medicine that bore the registered trademark ‘Budecort-200’ Budesonide Inhaler’. The defendant was also distributing medicine under the name ‘Budecort-200 inhaler’. The product is manufactured by a company in India called Cipla Ltd. The manufacturer had an agreement with the plaintiff that the plaintiff would be the sole distributor of the product in Kenya.  The defendant had also registered its interest with the manufacturer and was a parallel importer. The plaintiff represented by Senior Counsel Oraro unsuccessfully sought for an interlocutory injunction.

Differences between the two decisions that affect the question
The defense strategy- in the Nivea case the defendant alleged that the marks are not deceptively similar whereas in the Lord healthcare case the defense claimed that the products and the mark are the same as such no question as to deceptive similarity arose.
In the Lord Healthcare case there was an international registered trademark that belonged to the manufacturer and there was also a similar local registered trademark that belonged to the plaintiff. There was therefore conflict as to whether the local registration was valid. There was no conflict of international and national registration of the trademark in the Nivea case. The international registration was under the Paris Convention which Kenya is a signatory to.
In the Lord Healthcare case the manufacturer who supplied both the plaintiff and the defendant was the same whereas in the Nivea case the plaintiff was the manufacturer and distributor of its products through its subsidiary.
 In the Nivea case the plaintiff apart from claiming infringement also claimed passing of whereas in the Lord Healthcare case the plaintiff main weapon was only infringement.
In the Nivea case the plaintiff had acquired immense goodwill for distributing his products from 1971 to 2002 whereas this was not so in the Lord Healthcare case.
In the Nivea case there was the likelihood of bad faith by the defendant as he was the formerly employed production manager. He resigned without giving clear reasons and set up the defendant company.
In the Lord Healthcare case the certificate of registration did not provide that the certificate was for use in legal proceedings.
Section 7(1) of the Kenya Trademarks Act guides us that the proprietor of a trademark has the exclusive use to the use of the mark and anyone else who intends to use the mark must seek permission. Prof Lionel Bentley in his book Intellectual Property Rights[1]asserts that the presumption is that when a mark is registered it is deemed to have been registered duly. However this presumption is rebuttable. The facts are that in the Lord Healthcare case there was an international registration of the same mark under the Paris Convention under which Kenya is a signatory as such the Plaintiffs similar mark should not have been registered as there is a conflict between two registrations as there were to different people, the manufacturer and the plaintiff, as such the national registration was invalid.
The restatement of section 7(1) of the Trademarks Act by Judge Mbaluto was good law. However in light of the decision by Judge Okwengu we find that section 7(1) is inaccurately limited as it does not take into account particular extraneous circumstances. These circumstances include;
1.      The fact that international registration of the mark is not considered.
2.      The fact that a certificate for registration must indicate if it for use in legal proceedings.
3.      The fact that a parallel importer does not gain exclusive rights to use a mark in relation to parallel importers.
4.      The fact that can a parallel distributor register a mark that is similar to products that are sold by other distributor and thereby gain exclusive rights to the mark?
5.      The fact that a distributor can only register a mark that is for a distinct product to gain exclusive use and not in relation to a product that is lawfully supplied to other distributors by the manufacturer.
6.      The fact that a registered trademark owner who is a manufacturer must himself first grant an exclusive license to a distributor in order for the distributor to have exclusive rights to sue and therefore gain locus.section7(1) must consider the intricate detail of locus standi in light of the new circumstances that were evident in the Lord Healthcare case
7.      The fact that an exclusive right to distribution does not encompass the exclusive right to use a mark.
The above outlined circumstances must be deeply considered by a court of law in order to determine exclusive use of a mark. There cannot be an iota of doubt as to the exclusive use of a mark.  As such the ruling by Judge Mbaluto was to some extent inaccurate as it did not fathom these circumstances.
Bibliography
1.      The Kenya Trademarks Act
2.      Beiersdorf Ag v Emirchem Products Ltd. 2002 KLR 1,7
3.      Lords Healthcare v Salama Pharmaceuticals, Civil Suit 334 of 2007
4.      L. Bently, Intellectual Property Law, 4th edn, Oxford University Press




[1] L. Bently, Intellectual Property Law, 4th edn, Oxford University Press

Wednesday, 13 July 2016

The Principle of Legality

The Principle of Legality
‘Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege[1]’
The maxim loosely means neither crime nor punishment without law[2]. It is a mechanism to ensure that the state, its organs and its officials do not consider themselves to be above the law in the exercise of their functions but remain subject to it[3].
The principle of legality is not only a core value but a human right and an absolute defense in criminal law[4]. In essence no crime can exist without a legal backing that foresaw it. It enhances the preservation of human liberty by preventing state abuse and unnecessary interference of the citizenry[5].
The maxim in general seeks to;
1.      Abolition of existing common law penal doctrines.
2.      The prohibition of the judicial creation of new penal rules
3.      Prevent special rules mandating that penal statutes be construed strictly
4.      The prohibition of ex post facto penal laws
5.      Prevent the due process bar on the retroactive application of judicial interpretations altering criminal rules
6.      Due process invalidation of vague criminal statutes[6]
States cannot pass retroactive or ex-post facto legislation that to criminalize an act already done. The law must criminalize something before it happens in order for it to successfully catch offenders[7]. The law is premised on the notion that people must have adequate and due notice to know what an offence is, and what is not. This is the opportunity to see and understand what constitutes criminal behavior and thus culpability.
The origins of this fundamental principle are dated back to the Nuremberg tribunals of world war two, where they acknowledged individual criminal responsibility from a tri-dimensional perspective: legal, moral and criminal[8].
Manifestation of the Principle in International Instruments
According to Article 2(5) ad 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya international law shall form part of the laws of Kenya. As such there are some key instruments that Kenya has ratified that contain the principle of legality. Key among these is;
1.      Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby”
2.      Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human and Peoples Rights
“No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed”
3.      Geneva Conventions
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, art. 75(4)(c)(1977)
“No one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law to which he was subject at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby”
Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, art. 6(2)(c)(1977)
“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under the law, at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby”
Customary International Law[9]
This is the practice of states that has been done for a long time and is now accepted by states as law[10]. Put another way, “customary international law” results from a general and consistent practice of states that they follow from a sense of legal obligation[11]. These customs exist independent of treaty law and is thus a source of international law[12]. It is worth noting that these norms are binding upon all states[13]. The principle of legality has achieved customary international law status and thus binds all states

Manifestation of the Doctrine in National Law
The acts and omissions that constitute a crime are to be found in the penal code. Further the Constitution of Kenya which is the highest law on the land upon which other laws seek their validity states under Article 50(2) (n) of the Constitution that Every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right to not to be convicted for an act or omission that at the time it was committed or omitted was not an offence in Kenya or a crime under international law.
As such the importance of this maxim need not be stated as it is a general and fundamental principle of the criminal justice system of the world. It must be observed if strictly and with extreme caution.
Bibliography
Books
1.      Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 80 (5th ed., Cambridge, 2003)
Articles
2.      I. Crisan, The principles of legality “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege” and their role
3.      Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication, Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. OF PENN. L. REV. 335, 2005
4.      D. Meagher, The Principle of Legality as Clear Statement Rule: Significance and Problems, S.L.R
5.      L. Mnguni, The principle of legality in constitutional matters with reference to Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC)
Cases
6.      Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC)
Internet Sources
http://effectius.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/The_principles_of_legality_nullum_crimen_nulla_poena_sine_lege_and_their_role__Iulia_Crisan_Issue5.16811416.pdf


[3] L. Mnguni, The principle of legality in constitutional matters with reference to Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC); See also http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/LDD/2009/9.pdf
[5] D. Meagher, The Principle of Legality as Clear Statement Rule: Significance and Problems, S.L.R; See also https://sydney.edu.au/law/slr/slr_36/slr36_3/SLRv36n3Meagher.pdf
[6] Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication, Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. OF PENN. L. REV. 335, 2005 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=880761).
[7] Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC)
[8] I. Crisan, The principles of legality “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege” and their role
[11] Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 80 (5th ed., Cambridge, 2003)
[12] Article 38(b) Statutes of the International Court of Justice

Doctrine of Recent Possession. Kenyan Criminal Law

Doctrine of Recent Possession
The name is a misnomer as the doctrine does not refer to recent possession but recent possession of stolen property[1]. The doctrine is largely a part of the principles of circumstantial evidence and is manifest to prove mens rea of the offence of handling stolen goods.
The ‘doctrine’ was explained in the case of R v Abramovitch[2] and lays down that when a person charged with handling stolen goods is found in possession of, or dealing with, goods that have recently been stolen, a jury may infer that he is guilty if he offers no explanation of his possession or they do not believe the explanation given. The jury is not bound to draw such an inference and must only do so if they are satisfied that he has committed the offence charged[3].
Applying this to the Kenyan Jurisdiction we infer the elements to be that when one is found with recently stolen property, and offers no explanation of his possession or the explanation cannot be believed then it is inferred that they know that the goods are stolen and are therefore liable for the offence.
More succinctly put; if the prosecution establishes the fact of theft and the fact of recent possession by the accused of the stolen goods, then, in the absence of any evidence to explain how the accused obtained possession of them, the jury may convict the accused[4].
The period of recency is mostly associated with the recency of theft rather than recency of possession[5]. It is a matter of circumstances such as type and size of the items. In certain cases recency can include periods longer than a month.
It is a rebuttable presumption that Arises in Court when it believes that the person in possession of the goods knew or had reason to believe that the goods were stolen or otherwise unlawfully received. It doesn’t apply to where the possessor is not the thief, however if you are found with stolen property of which you cannot account for then it is presumed that you are the thief[6]or handler by receiving.
It is possession by an accused person of recently stolen goods that constitutes the foundation of a prima facie case against him and creates a presumption of guilt. It is a persuasive presumption which imposes on the accused person a burden of giving an explanation of his possession that might reasonably be true. When such an explanation has been given the burden then continues to rest, as always, on the State to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt[7].
The Doctrine doesn’t apply to all cases of theft. The general rule is that where it is proved that property has been stolen and very soon after the stealing the accused has been found in possession of it then it is open to the court to find him guilty of stealing or handling by way of receiving on the basis of the particular facts and circumstances of the case.
Ingredients:
1.     Ownership of the article
2.     Theft of the article
3.     Recent possession by the accused[8]
The burden is on the accused to explain and absence of a plausible explanation fuels the fire and leads to a likely conviction.
The time and application of the presumption is unlimited to time as it will vary according to the article that has been stolen. For instance 3 months has been held to be sufficiently recent for a motor car[9], the court must note the scope and limitation of the doctrine e.g. 7 months after a stolen tire pump was found was held to not be recent[10].
Presumption of Recent Possession v Presumption of Innocence
1.     The presumption of recent possession is a presumption of fact and not a presumption of law as the presumption of innocence[11].
2.     The presumption of fact does not displace the presumption of innocence thereby shifting the burden to the accused of producing legal proof of the innocent origin of the article. Burden remains on the state accused is merely expected to state how it originated[12]
Defenses
Honest claim of right, an honest claim of right is a defense, where one honestly asserts what he believes to be a lawful claim even though it is unfounded in law or fact, however absurd prevents the taking from being theft.[13]
It may appear that a claim of right supports a plea of ignorance of the law but where it raises the benefit of doubt, it should be accorded to the accused.

Bibliography
Books/Articles
1.     Musyoka William: Criminal Law, Law Africa Publishers
2.     J.D Morton, Burdens of Proof and the Doctrine of Recent Possession, O.H.L.J, Vol 1
Cases
3.     Chaama Hassan Hasa v The Republic (1974) KLR 6 1976
4.       R v O'Keefe [1958] O.R. 499 (C.A.)
5.       Seif Ally v The Republic (1976) LRT 215 (J Mwakibete)
6.       Odhiambo v The Republic 2002 1 KLR 241
7.       Abdullah Ibrahim v R (1960) EA 43( J Law)
8.       Mwihambi s/o Chinyele and another v Regina( 1953) 2 TLR
9.       Rex v Hassani s/o Mohammed alias Kinyonyoke 1948 15 EACA 121
Internet Articles
10.                      http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100407690  




[2] [1914–15] All ER 204
[3] J.D Morton, Burdens of Proof and the Doctrine of Recent Possession, O.H.L.J, Vol 1
[4] [1958] O.R. 499 (C.A.)
[6] Chaama Hassan Hasa v The Republic (1974) KLR 6 1976
[7] R v O'Keefe [1958] O.R. 499 (C.A.)
[8] Seif Ally v The Republic (1976) LRT 215 (J Mwakibete)
[9] Odhiambo v The Republic 2002 1 KLR 241
[10] Abdullah Ibrahim v R (1960) EA 43( J Law)
[11] Mwihambi s/o Chinyele and another v Regina( 1953) 2 TLR
[12] Rex v Hassani s/o Mohammed alias Kinyonyoke 1948 15 EACA 121
[13] Oyat v Uganda 1967 EA 827( Sir Udo Udoma)