Tuesday, 10 February 2015

Judicial Review

                             

Judicial Review is the process through which an aggrieved person can find redress in a Court of Law.  Judicial Review forms part of administrative law because it is the most appropriate way that an aggrieved party aggrieved by an administrative body can find redress.

Reading Material

1.                  Brian Thompson – Text Book on Constitutional and Administrative Law 2nd Edition 1995.
2.                  Peter Cane, An Introduction to Administrative law 3rd Ed. 1996
3.                  P L O Lumumba – An outline of judicial Review in Kenya, 1999
4.                  Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Civil Procedure Act Cap 21
5.                  The Constitution 2010 Revised Ed. 2010

Definition of Administrative Law –
Administrative Law can be defined as the law relating to public administration.  It is the law relating to the performance, management and execution of public affairs and duties.  Administrative law is concerned with the way in which the govt carries out its functions.  Administrative functions can be divided into a number of broad categories namely
1.                  Ministerial Functions; Examples of Ministerial Functions are those functions carried out or performed by Government Ministers in their implementation of governmental policies and programs.  Examples include appointment of public officials by Ministers and the grant of ministerial approvals and consents.
2.                  Administrative Functions - these are the functions carried out by public officials and public bodies in their management of various governmental bodies in their provision of service for example educational services and in their administration of various social services as in the case of social security services.  Please note that management of public schools and universities provide yet another example of administrative functions of governmental bodies.
3.                  Legislative Functions: These include the function of making or creating subsidiary legislation.  The responsibility of legislative functions is on the respective Ministers’.  The duty of making by-laws is also the respective minister’s.
4.                  Judicial Functions:  These primarily involve the functions of determining claims or disputes between individuals and other bodies.  A good example of administrative body that performs judicial functions is the Industrial Court which functions as a court of law.
5.                  Quasi Judicial Functions:  These involve the exercise of powers which are fundamentally judicial but without the usual trappings of a court of law for example without strict requirement of rules of evidence or the observance of rules of evidence, without strict requirements of examination of witnesses and without other legal technicalities a good example being the Liquor Licensing Court, the Land Control Boards and the Motor Vehicle Licensing Authorities. 
In the exercise of the various functions, public officials and public bodies do various things
(a)                They make decisions for example they make decisions on application for licences;
(b)               They exercise discretion.  The exercise of discretion is an important aid to the exercise of decision-making powers.  A public official has the power to exercise discretion whenever the effective limits of his/her power leaves him/her free to make a choice among possible causes of action or inaction for example an official may be required by law to meet expenses resulting from an emergency or disaster without the law defining what amounts to an emergency or disaster and in such a case the public official would have discretion to decide what amounts to a disaster. 
(c)                They also resolve disputes between individuals and governmental agencies or between individuals and private bodies. 
(d)               They make laws, rules and regulations.
(e)                They determine appeals against adverse decisions made by administrative bodies.
In performing all of these functions and many more that time will not allow us to enumerate, there are certain requirements:
(i)                 They must conform to the constitution; for example in their legislative function S. 3 of the Constitution places a requirement that any law, rule or regulation made must be in conformity with the constitution Section 3 of the Constitution states as follows “if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.”
(ii)               They must also conform to statutes so that if the statutes grant powers they must exercise only those powers that are granted by the statutes.  They must keep within the powers that they have been granted by the statutes.
(iii)             If any procedure is prescribed, they must follow that procedure.
(iv)             They must uphold the rules of natural justice;
(v)               They must act within the jurisdiction;
(vi)             They must act rationally;
(vii)           They are required to act in good faith;
(viii)         They must exercise their discretionary powers properly;
(ix)             They must act impartially in other words they must act without bias;

Please note that in a lot of cases, often, public officials and public bodies fail to conform to these requirements and act in excess of authority bestowed upon them by law.  In cases where an administrative official or body acts in excess of power conferred on them by law, people are likely to suffer i.e. a person is likely to be aggrieved.  Therefore, there has to be a way to provide remedy in cases where a person has been aggrieved.  Judicial Review is the most appropriate way by which remedies may be provided against the excessive exercise of power by administrative bodies.  Therefore judicial review forms an integral part of administrative law.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Judicial Review – Examining the Actions (inactions) of public Bodies by the Courts

Judicial Review is an examination of the manner in which a decision was made or an act done or not done.  This definition is found in Chief Constable of North Water Police V. Evans  [1982] 1 WLR 1155
The purposes of Judicial Review from that definition are as follows:
1.      To prevent excessive exercise of powers by administrative bodies and officials;
2.      To ensure that an individual is given fair treatment by Administrative authorities;
3.      To keep Administrative excesses in check and also to provide a remedy to those aggrieved as a result of excessive exercise of power by administrative bodies.

ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN KENYA

Our legal system, our system of laws, rules and regulations was derived from the English Legal System and so was Judicial Review.  In England Judicial Review developed from the ancient prerogative writs of Mandamus, Prohibition and Certiorari.  In England these writs issued in certain cases such as those in which the principles of natural justice had not been observed.  All writs were in the form of commands issued by the Crown (King or Queen).  These writs were later codified into English Law meaning that when they issued from the Crown, they were verbal which was later introduced in Kenya with the advent of colonialism.

Please Note:  Over time there have been significant developments in England with regard to judicial review and the issue of these 3 orders, Mandamus, Prohibition and Certiorari and most importantly many cases concerning judicial review have been decided in England which are of persuasive authority and guidance to our courts in Kenya especially in areas where Kenya’s jurisprudence in relation to Judicial Review has not developed.  Therefore in the absence of Kenyan Court Cases setting out or clarifying matters concerning Judicial Review, we will rely on English Cases for illustration.

Our discussion now concerning Judicial Review will focus on the introduction of Judicial Review in Kenya.

INTRODUCTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN KENYA

In Kenya the birth of prerogative orders (prohibition, mandamus and certiorari) came with the application of the colonial administration of justice through a statute called “Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1938 in particular Section 7 of this Act provided that in any case in which the High Court of England may by virtue of the provisions of the Section issue prerogative writs of Mandamus, Prohibition and Certiorari the High Court of Kenya shall have power to make a like order i.e. they empowered the High Court in Kenya to act in providing redress by providing the same order which could not previously issue.

Another developed was the passing of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance No. 18 of 1956 which came into effect on December 18 1956 and the effect of this law was that it replaced the word ‘writ’ with the word ‘order’.
Another development took place in 1960 and in this year Section 8 (2) of the 1956 Ordinance which had until then restricted applications for these orders only to cases where there were no alternative remedies was replaced.  This section was replaced by another ordinance known as the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Amendment) Ordinance which now allowed an aggrieved person to obtain any one or more of those prerogative orders the presence of an alternative remedy not withstanding. 

The problem as of that time was that the words ‘Crown’ was still maintained which was not applicable to the circumstances of the people of this country and soon after independence the word ‘Crown’ was removed.  In 1966 they passed the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act which replaced the word ‘Crown’ with the word ‘Government’.  Regardless of these changes, The Law Reform Act which was inherited from the Law Reform Ordinance of (1960) still recognised English Law governing the prerogative orders as the guideline with reference to which the High Court in Kenya could issue the orders i.e. we were not independent and had to look to the source for guidance.

Section 8 of the Law Reform Act provided as follows
That the High Court shall not whether in the exercise of its civil or criminal jurisdiction issue any of the prerogative orders of Mandamus, Prohibition or Certiorari”
Section 8 (2) “in any case in which the High Court in England is by virtue of the provisions of Section 7 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous provisions) Act of 1938 of United Kingdom empowered to make an order of Mandamus, Prohibition or Certiorari, the High Court of Kenya shall have power to make a like order.
In other words this Act provides that the High Court of Kenya shall issue any one or more of these orders only where the High Court of England can issue such orders.  These orders only issue upon judicial review.  They are the only remedies that the courts in Kenya can grant upon judicial review.
Another important factor regarding applicability of judicial review is provided for under Section 9 of the Law Reform Act Cap 26 Laws of Kenya.  The primary legal basis of Judicial Review is the Law Reform Act.  From the wording of S. 8, only the High Court can issue these orders.  You can only apply for Judicial Review in the High Courts and not the Magistrates Courts.

Section 9 of Law Reform Act provides in subsection (1) that any power to make rules of courts to provide for any matters relating to the procedure of civil courts shall include power to make rules of court regarding the following:
1.                  Prescribing the procedure and fees payable on documents filed or issued in cases where an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari is sought;
2.                  Section 9 (1) (b) provides that rules can be made requiring that leave shall be obtained before an application is made for any one of these orders.
3.                  Section 9 (1) (c) provides that if the courts grant leave for judicial review and then you proceed to file an application of judicial review, only those orders that you specified in your leave application will be granted.
4.                  Section 9 (2) provides for time limitation and authorises that rules be made prescribing a time period of 6 months or less within which an application for any one of the prerogative orders can be made.  However, when it comes to Certiorari subsection (3) makes it very clear that if you intend to apply for the order of certiorari you must seek the court’s leave before 6 months are over.

Pursuant to Section 9 (1) (a) the specific procedure has been stipulated under Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules for applying for leave to apply for Judicial Review and for applying for Judicial Review.
The Civil Procedure Act is therefore the Act of Parliament that sets forth the procedure for applying for Judicial Review or so called prerogative orders.  In addition to the Law Reform Act we have the Civil Procedure Act forming the legal basis for Judicial Review.

Section 65(2) of the Constitution is the Constitutional basis for Judicial Review.

LEGAL BASIS OF PREROGATIVE ORDERS/JUDICIAL REVIEW
  • Law Reform Act
  • Civil Procedure Act
  • Constitution.
                                                                       

GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

By looking at the grounds of judicial review, we will be studying the circumstances in which an aggrieved person may petition the High Court for Judicial Review.  We will be looking at cases of failure to conform to one or more of the requirements that we listed last week.

Please note that Courts of Law will intervene in public administration in one or more of the following circumstances i.e. courts of law will review actions of admin bodies in one or more of the following circumstances
1.                  When a body acts ultra vires;
2.                  When there is jurisdictional error;
3.                  When there is an error of law;
4.                  When there is an error of fact;
5.                  When there is an abuse of power;
6.                  When irrelevant considerations governed the making of a decision;
7.                  When there is bias
8.                  When there is unfair hearing;
9.                  When there is procedural flaw;
10.              When there is irrationality
11.              When a public official or body acts in bad faith;
12.              When there is breach of principles of natural justice.
There are overlaps in these grounds e.g. what amounts to procedural flaw may at the same time amount to ultra vires.  In actual practice any one of the grounds will entitle an aggrieved party to apply for judicial review and in actual practice circumstances occasioning judicial review will involve one or more of those grounds.  We don’t have to have all the 12 circumstances to apply for judicial review any one of the grounds will suffice plus the list is not exhaustive.  Further developments on a case by case basis may add more grounds.

1.         DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES
The doctrine of ultra vires is a legal doctrine

In English Legal System Judicial control of administrative agencies is based on the doctrine of ultra vires.  This may mean a number of things but surely it does mean in the English legal system the basic doctrine governing judicial intervention in administrative function is the doctrine of ultra vires.  It means simply that this is the doctrine on the basis of which the courts will interfere or intervene in matters of public administration.  Ordinarily courts would not interfere.

WHAT IS ULTRA VIRES
It simply means beyond the powers so that if ultra vires is the basis in which courts will interfere or intervene on matters of public administration then the point is that court will intervene on matters of public admin if the admin bodies have acted beyond the powers that have been conferred on them.

  • The essence of this doctrine is that administrative bodies must act within the powers granted them by statutes. 
  • They must also act within the requirement of common law. 
Administrative bodies must act only within the powers that they have been given by the statutes.  They must also recognise the limits imposed on them by the statutes.   The exercise of powers by administrative bodies often affects the rights of citizens and for this reason it is necessary that these powers be exercised only with accordance with the statute granting the power so that people do not suffer.  Limits are placed by statutes to ensure that powers conferred to admin bodies do not end up causing suffering to citizens.

For these reasons any act of a public administrative body that is outside the limit of law has no legal validity because it is ultra vires.  When we refer to law we mean firstly common law, statute law and beyond that we have the Constitution and they would have to act within all these and within any other regulations that have been put in place.

The term ultra vires can cover a wide range of actions undertaken in excess of the law or in excess of the powers granted.  For example a body acts ultra vires if that body does an act which it has no authority to do.
One case is where an admin body does things that is not authorised to do.  The second example is where an administrative body in the process of exercising the powers it abuses those powers, which amounts to acting ultra vires.  There are also cases where bodies act ultra vires because in the cause of exercising those things that are authorised, they have failed to follow prescribed procedure.  If you consider these instances, a person in the process of doing the authorised things abuses the powers, or where they are exercising the conferred powers but they fail to observe procedure.  One is substantive ultra vires and procedural ultra vires.

Substantive ultra vires.
Substantive ultra vires is acting in excess of powers with regard to matters of substance.  This would include for example acting beyond what is authorised.  What is authorised is a matter of substance.  The service that is authorised is a matter of substance.  Substantive ultra vires includes the following cases:
(a)                Exercising power in excess of statutory limits;
(b)               Acting in excess of jurisdiction;
(c)                Breach of the principles of natural justice; in this case failure to give notice of hearing to a concerned party for example would amount to breach of principles of natural justice and that falls under substantive ultra vires;

Procedural Ultra Vires
In addition to substantive ultra vires that is in addition to cases where admin bodies may go beyond their powers on matters of substance, there are also cases of procedural ultra vires.  These are cases where admin bodies fail to follow prescribed procedure.  They also include cases where an error occurs in following procedure.

Whereas we do have procedure prescribed in statutes, there are also matters of procedure that are not in the statutes but they are applicable under common law and this is where we find the procedural requirements that fall under the principles of natural justice.  A person has to be given notice of a hearing of their case; this is one of principles of natural justice.  This is in order that the person affected must be made aware of what is going on and be given an opportunity to raise any objection that they might have, they must have the chance to defend themselves.

Please remember that courts have been prepared and are mandated to use or to apply ultra vires doctrine in the cases that we have cited to invalidate actions of public bodies.  If a body has done something that amounts to procedural ultra vires, the court will be prepared to apply the doctrine of ultra vires to invalidate that action.
The effect of finding that an act or a decision is ultra vires is that it is invalidated.  It means that the court will declare that act or decision null and void.

White and Collins vs. Minister of Health [1939] 2 KB 838
This case concerns the exercise of power of compulsory purchase of land.  In this case a housing authority was granted power under the Housing Act of 1936 to acquire land compulsorily for housing ‘provided that land did not form part of any park, garden or pleasure ground.’ The Housing Authority went ahead and acquired land or purported to acquire land that was a park.  After they acquired this land, they sought and obtained confirmation of their acquisition from the Minister of Health (the one responsible for giving confirmation of such services).  The parties brought a suit seeking to have the purchase order invalidated on the grounds that the order to purchase this land was ultra vires.  The purchase itself was also ultra vires because the land was a park and there was a statutory restriction on the purchase of any land that was a park.  The court quashed the order for purchase as well as the purchase declaring it null and void.  (The court order that quashes is certiorari)

Sheikh Brothers Ltd vs. Hotels Authority [1940] K.L.R. 23
The Hotels Authority the defendant in this case was empowered by regulation to fix or vary the percentage of accommodation rates which should be available to monthly hotel residents as it may consider reasonable.  At a time when the percentage for monthly residents had been 85% the Authority fixed the percentage at 100%.  In other words the Authority fixed the percentage at 100% instead of the previous 85%.  The Hotel owners sought to have the decision set aside by certiorari.  The court held that the authority had clearly exceeded its powers.  The wording in the regulation the court said, in allowing a portion of accommodation rates to be fixed required that some comparative relation must be maintained between the accommodation rates fixed for monthly residents and other residents.  The fixing of the percentage at 100% did away with the element of proportion.  (Substantive ultra vires)

Please note that in some cases courts will interpret the relevant statutes to find out if the particular act complained of is provided for.

2.         UNREASONABLENESS
One of the things the court considers, in determining unreasonableness is whether a public body has considered or taken into account any matter that it ought not to take into account.  Another thing that the court will consider is whether a public body has disregarded any matter that it ought to take into account.

R V. Ealing London Borough Council Ex parte Times Newspapers Ltd (1986) 85 L.G.R. 316 (Local Government Reports)
In this case the council was held to be unreasonable in refusing to provide certain Newspapers to their libraries because the council did not agree with the Newspapers Proprietors on political grounds.  The court held that the council was unreasonable in refusing to provide their libraries with certain Newspapers.
An example of a matter that amounts to unreasonableness.

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 K.B 223
The Sunday Entertainment Act of 1932 empowered local authorities to grant licences for cinematograph performances and to allow and licence a place to be opened and used for cinematograph performances subject to such conditions as the authority thinks fit to impose.  The local authority granted the Plaintiffs licences for Sunday performance subject to one condition that no children under 15 yrs of age should be permitted to Sunday performance with or without an adult.

A local authority empowered to attach such conditions as it thought fit to the grant of a permit for Sunday cinema opening, imposed a condition that no child under fifteen should be admitted to a Sunday performance at all.  The condition was attacked as being void for unreasonableness.  The Court of Appeal held that it was valid.

The court held in an action for declaration that this condition was reasonable, the court held that the local authority had not acted unreasonably.  In imposing this condition, the licensing authority had not acted ultra vires.  The court then went on to state “what a court would be looking at when faced with unreasonableness is whether
(i)                             Matters that need to be taken into account have been taken into account;
(ii)                           Omitted matters that ought to be considered have been considered.

3.         JURISDICTIONAL ERROR:
Scope or area in which a body is allowed to act; includes territorial limits.  Where there is error it means:
1.                  That an administrative agency has acted without jurisdiction.  They have acted over matters which they have no authority to act.
2.                  They have acted within jurisdiction but have gone beyond or exceeded this can happen:
(a)                When a body erroneously exercises power or authority over a matter that is outside of its territorial limits.
(b)               Where a body legislates over a matter that falls outside of the matters it is authorised to legislate over.
(c)                Where an administrative body declines to exercise jurisdiction to hear and decide a case or to legislate over a matter over which it has jurisdiction to hear or decide or legislate over; (Authority to do something but decline to do it.)
(d)               It may also arise when a body fails to administer a function or to carry out a duty that it has the statutory authority to administer or to carry out.

In case any one of these things occurs and a person is aggrieved, as a result the aggrieved person can apply to the High Court for Judicial Review on the ground that a public body has committed jurisdictional error.

Commission Anisminic Ltd. V. Foreign Compensation (1969) 2 AC 147
The dispute in this case arose from the agreement between the Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom that a sum be paid by Egypt to provide compensation for those British companies and persons whose property had been lost or damaged in the 1956 Suez incident, and subsequent expropriations of British property by the Egyptian government.   The United Kingdom Government entrusted the distribution of compensation to the Foreign Compensation Commission and section 4(4) of the Foreign Compensation Act provided that ‘The determination by the Commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be called into question in any court of law.’ The statutory instrument defining the powers of the Commission in relation to applications arising out of the Suez incident contained complicated and obscure provisions as to the nationality of applicants for compensation.  The object was to ensure that only those of British nationality received compensation, be they the original owners of the property lost or damaged, or their successors in title.  Anisminic was a British company but its property had been first sequestrated and then sold to an Egyptian organization.  The Commission interpreted the statutory statement defining proper applicants for compensation as excluding Anisminic because their successor in title was of Egyptian nationality.  The House of Lords held that the Commission had misconstrued the instrument because where the original owner of the property claimed he was British the nationality of his successor in title was irrelevant.  The Commission had considered a matter totally irrelevant to the questions which they had been granted jurisdiction to determine.  They had embarked on an enquiry beyond the limited inquiry directed by Parliament.  Accordingly they had exceeded their jurisdiction and their purported determination was invalid and not protected by the provision preventing proper determination of the Commission being questioned in courts.
           
4.         ERROR OF LAW
An error of law is a condition or an act of ignorance, negligence or imprudent deviation or departure from the law.
Ignorant departure would include a situation where an administration official is ignorant of the law.  If the minister of local govt for example has no idea that he cannot sack an elected mayor, this is an act of ignorance.{Msa}    Negligence would be where an admin body fails to do what the law provides and in this case they have failed to look up the law to see what it provides.

This can result from a number of things
1.                  Failure to ascertain what the law is on a particular matter or what the law says about a particular matter;
2.                  It may also occur as a result of misconstruction of the law;
3.                  Misinterpretation of the law;
4.                  Blatant disregard of the law;
5.                  Misunderstanding of the law; or
6.                  Misdirection on the law (this involves a situation where an admin body seeks direction on the law) i.e. if the head of civil service seeks direction from the AG or from the Chief Justice or Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs and they have given directions that are not correct we may say that this is a misdirection.

In all these cases, it is usually said that there is an error of law on the face of the record.  An error of the law on face of the record is an error which may be ascertained by an examination of the record of proceedings without recourse to any evidence.  Just by looking at the record of proceedings, one can tell that the law was not followed.
The result of error of law is that the decision made in error, all the acts done in error of law are invalidated upon judicial review because they are illegal and therefore upon judicial review they are invalidated.

R v. Northumberland Compensation Appeals  Tribunal ex parte Shaw (1952) 1 KB 338

In this case a former employee of an administrative body claimed compensation on termination of his employment.  Under the applicable regulations the tribunal was required to assess compensation payable by aggregating two periods of employment i.e. the law was saying in computing compensation would have to aggregate two periods of employment.  In its decision the tribunal stated that of the two periods of employment, they would take into account only the second period.  Upon application for judicial review this decision was quashed because of the error of law that had been committed.  The court found that this amounted to an error on the face of the record and the decision was quashed.  The court issued an order of certiorari.  The main remedy where there is an error of law or an error on the face of the record is certiorari.  It involves removal of proceedings to the High Court so they can be quashed.

Kenneth Matiba V. The Attorney General High Court Misc. Civil App. No. 790 of 1993

In this case the court considered a decision made by the rules committee of the High Court regarding applications for leave to apply for judicial review.  The rules committee of the High Court is empowered to make rules for judicial review and these rules must be in conformity with the enabling statute which is the Law Reform Act Cap 26.  By Legal Notice No. 164 of 1992, the committee purported to amend Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules by doing away with the requirement of leave as a condition precedent to applying for judicial review.  In doing so they failed to adhere to sections 8 and 9 of the Law Reform Act which is the enabling statute.  This error was considered in the case of Kenneth Matiba versus the AG in which the court ruled that the act of the rules committee was null and void to the extent that it was not in conformity with the enabling statute.

5.         ERROR OF FACT
Please note that facts are an integral to the making of a decision.  The validity of a decision depends on the proper appreciation and interpretation of facts. 
An error of fact occurs where there has been an act or a condition of ignorance, negligence or imprudent deviation from facts.  This may occur from a number of facts
1.                  Where facts have not been properly appreciated;
2.                  Where facts have not been properly interpreted;
3.                  Where there is an incorrect finding of facts;
4.                  Where irrational conclusions are made from facts;
5.                  Where a decision is made without giving due regard to the factual circumstances of the case at hand.
The effect of error of facts is that it renders a decision null and void.  Where the existence or non-existence of a fact is not certain, it will be left to the judgment and discretion of the public body concerned.

6.         ABUSE OF POWER
Abuse of power includes cases where the power and authority given public bodies have
(a)                  Where power has been put to a wrong or improper use;
(b)                 Where power has been used so as to injure or to damage;
(c)                  Where power has been misused;
(d)                 Where power has been used corruptly.
If the court finds that an administrative body has abused its power or his power, any act done or decision made will be invalidated.

7.         IMPROPER EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
An administrative body has the authority to exercise discretion whenever the limits of his statutory authority leaves him to decide between two or more causes of action or inaction.  There will have to be a statutory authorisation to do something but the statutory provisions do not completely specify what one is authorised to do.  The exercise of discretion is an important aid to the exercise of statutory powers. 
Whenever circumstances give rise to the exercise of discretion:
(i)                 Discretion must be exercised properly;
(ii)               Discretion must be exercised reasonably;
(iii)             Discretion must be exercised by the proper authority only and not by a delegate;
(iv)             Discretion must be exercised without restraint

Certain circumstances will give rise to improper exercise of discretion which includes:
(i)                 Exercising discretion for improper motive;
(ii)               Where power to exercise discretion is delegated to a person who is not charged with the responsibility in question;
(iii)             Where discretion is exercised so as to serve self-interest.

Fernandes V. Kericho Liquor Licensing Court [1968] E.A. 640
The case concerns the authority given Kericho Liquor Licensing Court to grant licences.  In this case they decided they were only going to give liquor licences to Africans.  The Court ruled that they had exercised their discretion improperly by deciding to issue licences only to Africans.

8.         IRRELEVANCY
Irrelevancy is one of the grounds of judicial review.  What is irrelevancy?
Irrelevancy occurs in two situations that the courts will consider as amounting to irrelevancy
(i)                  matter which it ought not to consider in arriving at a decision;  e.g. if on the basis of a gender a licence is denied.
(ii)               Where an administrative body disregards something, which it ought to consider in making a decision.

Secretary of State for Education and Science V. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (1977) A .C. 1024
In this case the court stated that in its decision in the process of review it is for a court of law to establish whether in reaching the unfavourable decision complained of a public body has taken into consideration matters which upon the true construction of the act at issue ought not to have been considered and excluded from consideration matters that were relevant to what had to be considered.
Wenesdbury Case


9.         BIAS
It is a predetermined tendency to favour one outcome, one outlook or one person against another.  It involves acting partially i.e. acting favourably to one side.  Whenever an allegation of bias is made, a reviewing court will investigate whether there is an appearance of partiality.  A reviewing court will evaluate whether there is a tendency of one side to favour one person. 

There are certain principles that will guide the court in determining the presence of bias.
(i)                 The real likelihood of bias;
Circumstances in which the court will conclude that there was a real likelihood of bias include cases where the decision maker has an interest in the matter under consideration.  Interest may be pecuniary, interest may also be adverse (adverse interest suffices).
(ii)               The Real Danger Test: 
This is another of the tests that the court will apply in determining the presence or absence of bias.  The consideration is whether there is a real danger that a public official or body participating in a decision will be influenced by a personal interest in the outcome of a case. The question to ask is how significant the interest is and how closely or remotely related to the issue it is. In the real danger test the consideration is whether there is a real danger that an official participating in a decision will be influenced by a pecuniary interest and how close is it to the matter decided or how remote.

R V. Gough [1993] A.C. 646
(iii)       Actual Bias:
            There are cases where in the absence of the real likelihood of bias and in the absence of pecuniary and other interests, and in the absence of the real danger of partiality, bias does actually occur and in this situation the test is whether there was actual bias.   In cases where there is a likelihood of bias, for example in cases where members of the decision making body have a pecuniary interest in the matter to be considered, they must disqualify themselves from taking part in making that decision.  If they do not, this will give rise to bias and the decision made can be invalidated upon review.  Invalidation is by way of quashing so the decision is quashed.

10.       UNFAIR HEARING

Administrative bodies are bound to give a fair and proper hearing to those who come before them.  Often the statutes will prescribe the procedure for hearing indicating how concerned parties are to be heard.  In such statutory provisions the duty to grant a fair and proper hearing may be implied.  In the absence of statutory provisions setting forth procedure for hearing common law rules regarding fair and proper hearing will apply.

Where a public body makes a decision without due regard to prescribed procedure or without due regard to common law principles of fair hearing, an aggrieved party will be entitled to petition the court for review.

Neil V. North Antrim Magistrate’s Court (1992) WLR 1220

This case suggests that even if a right decision is arrived at a party may still petition the court if some procedural flaw occurred occasioning damage.  This means that if a party had a case and even if he argued that case as cogently as he could, failure to grant a fair hearing will bring the court to invalidate that decision no matter how bad the case was.  A person must have a chance to be heard.

Please note that failure to give a fair hearing will result in a null and void decision which means that if a party petitions the court for judicial review on the ground that he was not granted a fair hearing and should the court find that this person was not given a fair hearing, the court will declare the decision null and void.

11.       IRRATIONALITY
Irrationality is derived from the word irrational.  This means that if a decision making body or an administrative body acts irrationally, whatever that body does irrationally or whatever decision it makes irrationally can be invalidated upon judicial review.  Irrationally means conduct beyond the range of responses reasonably open to an administrative body.  In determining whether a particular act or decision is irrational, a reviewing court will consider whether a public body has done something which a reasonable body with the same function and confronted with the same circumstances could not do.  This is an objective test.

Associated Provincial Picture Houses V. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223


R V. Ealing London Borough Council ex parte Times Newspaper Ltd (1986) 85 LGR 316
In the Earling case, there was a clear case of abuse of power prompted by an irrelevant consideration where some local authorities refused to provide certain newspapers in their public libraries.  Their reason for the ban was that they were politically hostile to the newspapers’ proprietors, who had dismissed many of their workers when they went on strike.  The ulterior political object of the local authorities was irrelevant to their statutory duty to provide ‘a comprehensive and efficient library service.

12.       BAD FAITH (Mala Fides)
If the court finds that a body made a decision in bad faith, it will be invalidated.  It is rather hard to define bad faith but it covers a wide range of circumstances including malice, corruption, fraud, hatred and similar things.  It also includes cases of vindictiveness. 
Please note that breach of fundamental rights could also give rise to judicial review.

13.       BREACH OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE
Breach of principles of natural justice will give rise to judicial review.

Principles of natural justice: 
Natural defined: Natural is being in accordance with or determined by nature.  Based on the inherent sense of right and wrong.
JUST
Means just, morally upright, correct, proper, good, merited deserved etc.
From the definition you can see that justice is the maintenance, administration, provision or observance of what is just, good, correct, proper, merited or deserved.

With these two definitions of natural and justice, natural justice is the administration maintenance, provision or observance of what is just, right, proper, correct, morally upright, merited or deserved by virtue of the inherent nature of a person or based on the inherent sense of right and wrong. 

These principles of natural justice are rules governing procedure and conduct of administrative bodies.  They were developed by the courts in England and imported into Kenya as part of common law principles.
Principles of natural justice are implied so you will not see them expressed in a statute; they are supposed to apply in every case unless a statute expressly states that they will not apply.

Other grounds of judicial review such as error of law, are grounds in which courts might be said to be upholding administrative authorities within the boundaries of their powers conferred on them by statutes.  Unlike such grounds, principles of natural justice are applicable in the absence of statutory provisions authorising their applicability or their observance.  Unless natural justice is expressly or impliedly excluded by statutory provisions these principles are always to be implied.  It is to be implied that parliament has authorised the applicability and observance of the principles of natural justice in every case.

 

Fairmount Investments Ltd. Vs. Secretary of State [1976] 2 AER 865

To which bodies do the principles of natural justice apply?
In Kenya these principles apply so long as a public body has power to determine a question affecting a person’s rights in addition to questions affecting people’s rights, the principles apply to bodies in every case involving a question affecting a person’s interest.
Wherever there is a right there is an interest but not vice versa.  Interest may include other things.  Interest may be pecuniary interest or something else and does not necessarily have to be a right.

Mirugi Kariuki V. The Attorney General High Court Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1991

The court of appeal held that the mere fact that the exercise of discretion by a decision making body affects the legal rights or interests of a person makes the principles of natural justice applicable.  (It can be a right or some other interests)
These principles apply to administrative bodies that are judicial, quasi-judicial legislative or administrative.

The Principles/Rules
Broadly the principles are two
1.                  Nemo Judex in causa sua – which means that procedures must be free from bias.
2.                  Audi Alteram Partem – which means that no person should be condemned unheard.  That is a person should not be denied an opportunity to be heard.
These two principles have been broken down into a number of principles or rules which are as follows:
(i)                 Rule against Bias;
(ii)               The right to be heard;
(iii)             Prior Notice;
(iv)             Opportunity to be heard;
(v)               Disclosure of information;
(vi)             Adjournment;
(vii)           Cross examination;
(viii)         Giving reasons;
(ix)             Legal Representation.
1.         Rule Against Bias:
For bias please see previous lecture notes. In summary there can be bias when
(a)                There is some direct interest in the matter to be adjudicated; e.g. pecuniary interest;
(b)               Where short of a direct interest there is a reasonable appearance or likelihood of bias;
(c)                Where there is actual bias.

R V. Hendon Rural District Council ex-parte Chorley (1933) 2K.B. 696
In this case the court quashed the decision of a rural district council allowing some residential property in Hendon to be converted into a garage and restaurant because one of the councillors who was present at the meeting which approved the application to convert the premises was an Estate Agent who was at the same time acting for the owners of the properties.  The Court issued Certiorari to quash the decision of the council on the ground that the agent’s interest in the business disqualified him from taking part in the council’s consideration of the matter. 
Concerning likelihood of bias, the case is

Metropolitan Properties Ltd. Vs. Lannon (1968) 3 All E R 304
The court said; “in considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the Chairman of the tribunal who sits in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity.  The Court looks at the impression which would be given to other people.  Even if he was as impartial as he could be nevertheless, if right minded people would think that in the circumstances there was a real likelihood of bias on his part then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand. Surmises or conjecture is not enough there must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that it would or did favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other”.

The court quashed the decision of a rent assessment committee reducing rent of a certain flat because the chairman of the rent assessment committee lived with his father in those flats.

2.         Right to be Heard
This is simply that a concerned person must be given a right to be heard.  If an administrative body fails to give a concerned person the right to be heard, whatever decision it makes will be invalidated upon review.  The case that illustrates the point is the case of
David Onyango Oloo V. The Attorney General Civil Appeal NO. 152 of 1986
In this case the Commissioner of Prisons purported to deprive Onyango Oloo his sentence remission to which he was entitled under the Prisons Act without giving him an opportunity to be heard.  Quashing the decision, Justice Nyarangi stated there is a presumption in the interpretation of statutes that the rules of natural justice will apply.  In this case the rule in question was the one concerning the right to be heard.”

3.         Prior Notice
This Rule requires that adequate prior notice be given a person of any charge or allegation.  It simply means that if an admin body makes a charge it has to give a person against whom allegations have been made adequate notice before a decision is made.  Prior notice must be served on the relevant party.  The notice must contain sufficient detail to enable the person concerned to know the substance of any charge, allegation or action to be taken against him. 

Again the case of David Onyango Oloo applies here.  In that case the court also stated “The commissioner of prisons at the very least ought to have done the following acts
(i)                 Inform the Appellant in writing in a language the Appellant understands the disciplinary offence he is alleged to have committed and the particulars of the offence;
(ii)               Afford the Appellant an opportunity to be heard in person and to fix reasonable time within which the appellant must submit his written answer.
(iii)              
4.         Opportunity to be Heard
There is no settled rule as to whether hearing should be oral or written but in all cases one must be afforded a chance to present his case whether oral or written.
Board of Education V. Rice [1911] AC 179

5.         Disclosure of Information:
A concerned party must be given all information which the decision maker will rely on to make his judgment.  This rule requires that all allegations and reports bearing on a person’s case must be disclosed to that person.  Failure to do so is fatal to a decision.

Ridge V. Baldwin (1964) A.C. 40*
The House of Lords in this case held that the Chief Constable of Brighton who held an office, from which by statutory regulations he could only be removed on grounds of neglect of duty or inability, could not validly be dismissed in the absence of the notification of the charge and an opportunity to be heard in his defence.

This is one of the key cases in Judicial Review and disclosure of information.

6.         Adjournment
Natural Justice requires that a party be granted adjournment of a hearing of a case if the exigencies require.  (it does not matter how guilty a person is, if exigencies arise, they must be accorded an adjournment by the administrative body and if they are denied an adjournment and a decision is given, the court will quash such a decision)

Please note that wrongful refusal to adjourn amounts to a denial of a fair hearing and will result in the quashing of a decision.  This was stated in the case of

Priddle Vs. Fisher & Sons (1968) WLR 1478
A HEATING engineer was denied an adjournment in a case he was supposed to be represented by a trade union representative. The decision of the court arising out of the proceedings in the absence of the applicant was held to be unfair.

7.         Cross Examination
An opportunity to cross-examine can only be availed if there is an oral hearing i.e. the rule applies to cases where there is an oral hearing.   Whenever there is an oral hearing and a party requests to cross-examine, the affected party must be granted an opportunity to cross-examine.  If an affected party requests to cross-examine but an opportunity is denied, the decision made can be voided on grounds of breach of principles of natural justice.

Please note that if a party does not ask for a chance to cross examine, he is precluded from complaining.

8.         Giving Reasons
Progressively, courts are insisting on giving reasons for a decision as a component for natural justice.  (if an admin body denies you lets say a licence, they must give you the reasons why failure to which you can petition the High Court for a review) In this case

Padfield V. The Minister for Agriculture Fisheries and Food (1968) AC 977
Lord Reid stated “I cannot agree that a decision cannot be questioned if no reasons are given”.  Meaning if no reasons are given a decision can be questioned

9.         Legal Representation
This does not apply in every case but in suitable cases and suitable circumstances, the right to representation by a lawyer or some other person may be part of natural justice.  For example in the Liquor Licensing Act, it allows for a person applying for a licence to be represented by an authorised agent in which case he becomes the legal representative before the court.

Where legal representation is necessary, authorised and is requested by a party the right to legal representation must be granted.  If denied, a decision may be quashed on grounds of failure to observe the principles of natural justice.

Effect of breach of Principles of Natural Justice
The effect of failure to comply with the rules of natural justice is that any decision or other administrative action taken is null and void and can be invalidated by the courts.  Breach of principles of natural justice has been a good ground of judicial review.
Please note that breach of any one of the rules that we have discussed will give rise to judicial review.
Read Order 53 of the Civil Rules
Procedure for applying for judicial Review

PROCEDURE FOR APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Application for leave is by way of Chamber Summons under Civil Procedure Rules Order LIII.  This application is made ex parte in sub section 3 it requires that notice be given for application for leave.  The notice is to be given to the registrar of the High Court.

Time limitation is crucial.  Order 53 provides for time limits within which a person can apply for leave.  The law is very strict where it comes to certiorari, you have to file your application for leave within 6 months of the date your application e.g. when a liquor licensing was denied.  If you do not file within 6 months the court cannot grant an extension.
Time limitation is not stipulated for Mandamus or Prohibition but it is required that you file the application within a reasonable time.  Reasonable time means that you may serve 3 months after the licence was denied and be denied leave or for 8 months and they grant leave.  But with certiorari it has to be 6 months and it cannot be extended.

Order 53 (4) – Grant of leave to make the application can operate as a stay of proceedings.  It can be a stay of the proceedings that you are complaining about.
The grant of leave will operate as a stay of proceedings where you are seeking to quash whatever has taken place under certiorari.  Stay will only apply in case of certiorari and prohibition and not Mandamus.

APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Under section 3(1) after you have been granted leave, you make your application by way of Notice of Motion which will include a statement.  Within 21 days of the grant of leave, you must make your application.  If personal allegations have been made, you must serve the party that allegations have been made against. You must serve the other party, e.g. officials of liquor licensing court etc. within 8 clear days of hearing;
You file an Affidavit of Service stating some things usually a court process server will swear an Affidavit stating how they effected Service.

File the Affidavit of service within 8 clear days of hearing and file the Affidavit with a court registry and the affidavit must be in the file on the day of hearing.

Hearing:  This is when your application for Judicial Review is done.  The administrative body or tribunal will enter appearance which is done in a prescribed format.  After the court listens to your allegations, the court makes a ruling and the court may rule in your favour or against.  When asking for certiorari, you must categorically indicate that in your pleadings etc.


REMEDIES:
There are only three remedies that the courts can grant for judicial review
Certiorari
Prohibition;
Mandamus

Whether the courts will grant one of these rules depends on the circumstances.

CERTIORARI
The word Certiorari is a Latin word which simply means ‘to be informed’.  Historically it was a royal command or demand for information.  The practice was that the sovereign who was the king or the queen upon receiving a petition from a subject complaining of some injustice done to him would state that he wishes to be certified of the matter and then he would order the matter to be brought up to him.  Ordering the matter to be brought up to him will include ordering that the records of the proceedings be brought up to the sovereign.  The purpose of calling up the records was in order for the sovereign to quash any decision that has been made after acquainting himself of the matter in other words after being certified of the matter.

Currently, certiorari is an order to remove proceedings from an administrative body or an inferior court to the High Court in order to be investigated and if found wanting on any one of the grounds we studied including ultra vires, be quashed.  The order can issue against administrative tribunals, it can also issue against inferior courts such as the industrial courts, it can issue against local authorities, it can issue against Ministers of Government.  It can also issue against miscellaneous public bodies exercising public functions.

Majid Cockar V. Director of Pensions Nai H.C. Misc App 532 of 1998

This was the case between the former Chief Justice Cockar and the Director of Pensions.  In computing the pension payable to the CJ the pensions department made a mistake in their calculations. The former Chief Justice went to court and upon application for Judicial Review the court issued the order of certiorari to quash the decision awarding the former CJ an amount of money as pension.

For Certiorari to be issued, indeed for any one of the 3 orders to be issued, a person must be having Locus Standi which is crucial as you must have the capacity to sue.  You have capacity to sue by having a sufficient interest in the matter. If you don’t have sufficient interest in the matter, the court will not grant you any of the orders.  
According to Article 22 Any person who has sufficient interest can sue on behalf of another and even in the public interest.
In the case of Mureithi & 2 others v the Attorney general & 4 others. Justice Nyamu advocated for a broad minded approach when it came to the issue of standing, for the simple reason that Judicial review is a pillar in vindicating the rule of law.
This was affirmed in Republic v minister of information & broad casting and Ahmed Djibril ex parte East Africa Television Network Ltd

PROHIBITION:
The order of Prohibition is an order issued by the High Court which prohibits a body (administrative bodies) from continuing proceedings; it will also prohibit a body from continuing to carry out decisions wrongly or wrongfully made.  This order may be issued against judicial body acting in an administrative capacity i.e industrial court.  It can also issue against an administrative body performing administrative duties or against the government officials etc.  It can be issued to stop a public body from continuing proceedings that are ultra vires.  It can also be issued to stop an admin body from continuing to do something in excess of jurisdiction.  It can also be used to stop an administration body from abusing their powers.

R V. Electricity Commissioners Ex parte Electricity Joint Committee (1924) 1 K.B 171
At Page 559 Lord Denning stated as follows
“It is available to prohibit administrative authorities from exceeding their powers or misusing them.”
Lord Atkin in the same case said as follows
“If proceedings establish that the body complained of exceeded its jurisdiction, by entertaining matters which would result in its final decision being subject to being brought up and quashed on certiorari, I think that Prohibition will lie to restrain it from exceeding its jurisdiction.”

This illustrates the point that prohibition will lie to restrain an administrative body from doing something wrongly or misusing its power, abuse of power etc.

When one applies for the order of Certiorari, one is seeking to quash a decision that has already been made.  At the time of application for judicial review, the order you seek the court to quash must be presented to the court by making a photocopy of the order and attaching it to the Application. 

With Prohibition, you do not have to attach the copy of the order.

MANDAMUS:
The order of Mandamus is derived from the Latin word Mandare meaning to command.  It is a court order issued to compel the performance of a public duty where a public body or official has unlawfully refused, declined or otherwise failed to undertake the duty.  Mandamus is a court order issued to compel the performance of a public duty where a public body or official has public refused failed or declined to undertake a duty. 

Mandamus issues where there is a duty imposed by statute or common law.  Please note that the duty must be a public duty, Mandamus will not issue in respect of a duty that is of a private nature even if the body in question is a public body.  For example where two construction companies agree to undertake some work who agree to resolve any dispute between them by arbitration through the industrial court.  The industrial court will be performing a private function and thus the order of Mandamus cannot issue.

For Mandamus to issue, the Applicant must have made a request for the performance of a public duty which has been refused, declined or ignored.  This means that if a public admin body refused to do something, you must approach it and request it to perform the function or the courts will not hear you.  Unreasonable delay on the part of the public body will be treated as refusal.  The duty must be a specific duty.  You cannot apply for the order of Mandamus for a duty that is general, it must be specific e.g. under the English Gas (1972) it was the duty of the British Gas Corporation to develop an efficient coordinated and economical system of Gas supply for Great Britain.  Such an obligation is so imprecise i.e. it is so general that it would not be enforceable by the order of Mandamus.  The lack of specificity does not mean that it is meaningless.  Duty can be carried out but it is not precise.  Mandamus is used to enforce performance of specific duties and not the exercise of mere powers.

Kenya National Examination Council V. R      Ex parte Geoffrey Gathinji Njoroge & others Civil Appeal No. 266 of 1996
Justices of Appeal Tunoi and Shah stated as follows regarding the powers of the Kenya National Examination Council
“The times and frequency of the examinations are left to the discretion of the council and it cannot be enforced by Mandamus to hold an examination at any particular time of the year.

Daniel Nyongesa & Others V. Egerton University College Civil Appeal NO. 90 of 1989
In this case Nyongesa’s exam results were held by the university and when he went to court, the court issued an order of mandamus for the court to release the results. Nyongesa had requested the university for his results and they had refused so he applied for an order of mandamus to the court and he was granted.  There was a specific duty for the university to release the results.


DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ORDINARY REVIEW (REVIEW OF JUDGMENT)

Order XLIV Civil Review – APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS

In addition to judicial review there is what is known as ordinary review.  Judicial review is covered under Order 53 and Ordinary Review is provided for under Order 44 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 

 Ordinary Review is a review of judgment or order of a court of law.
 Judicial review is a review of an act or a decision of an administrative body.
When can a person review an ordinary review in a different court?

1.                 If the judge that made the decision is no longer at the station, then one can apply to a different court for review.
2.                 If the judge who made the judgment has not been present for 3 months after 3 months it is considered that there has been an inordinate delay and the court can allow you to review the decision in a different court.

There is no time limitation to when one can apply for an ordinary review but the application must be made without delay.  There is no requirement of leave of court to apply unlike in judicial review where one has to seek leave of court.

Ordinary Review is review of judgment or order made by a court of law (Judicial Review is review of an act or decision of an administrative body)

Ordinary Review is provided for under Order XLIV (44) of the Civil Procedure Rules.  This order provides that any person considering himself aggrieved by decree or an order from which an Appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been allowed, or a person who feels aggrieved by a decree or order from which no Appeal is allowed may petition the court that made the order of decree on the following conditions
(i)                On the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time the decree or order was made;
(ii)             On a count of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; for example error of law, typographical errors, mathematical errors etc.
(iii)           For any other sufficient reason.

In these 3 circumstances an aggrieved person may apply to the court which made the decree or order.  There are certain exceptions to the requirement that application for review be made to the court that made the decree or order
1.                 Where the Chief Justice orders some other person, i.e. some other judge or magistrate to hear their application for review;
2.                 Where the Judge or Magistrate who made the decree or the order is no longer attached to that court e.g. where they have been transferred or have resigned.
3.                 Where the Magistrate or Judge who made the order or decree has been absent from the station for more than 3 months from the date of filing of your application.
4.                 Where you have discovered new and important matter of evidence.

Note that there is no time limitation for application for ordinary review but it must be brought without unnecessary delay.  Upon ordinary Review, there may be a re-hearing of a case.  The case may be heard afresh.

No double review is allowed meaning that no application can be brought for review of an order issued upon an application for ordinary review.

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ORDINARY REVIEW AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

1.                 With judicial review an aggrieved party must first of all apply for leave of court and on the other hand there is no requirement for leave on application for ordinary review.
2.                 With Judicial Review especially where an applicant seeks the order of Certiorari the application must be brought within six months i.e. there is time limitation of six months on the other hand with ordinary review there is no time limitation but the application must be brought without unnecessary delay.
3.                 this is with regard to the grounds – the grounds for judicial review are not the same as those for ordinary review.

The Industrial Court is subordinate to the High Court even though it is presided over by a Judge. 
Kenya Airways Limited V. Kenya Airways Pilots Association H.C. Nai. Misc App No. 254 of 2001
Judicial Review is not an Appeal.

Distinction between Appeal and Judicial Review

An Appeal has been described as the transfer or taking of a case from a lower court to a higher court in the hope of reversing or modifying the decision of the former.  An Appeal involves taking a case to a higher court for rehearing to determine whether the decision arrived at by the lower court was right or wrong.  When one appeals a decision, one is claiming that it is wrong or incorrect on the basis of evidence tendered and the applicable law and that the appellate body should change the decision.  For example if X was found to have defamed Y upon judgment X might appeal that finding or the amount of damages which the court awarded to Y.  the court of Appeal if persuaded of the merits of the case may allow X’s Appeal in which case the court substitutes its view for that of the lower court.  Thus we can say, that on the other hand with judicial review, a court is not concerned with the merits of the case in other words, a court is not concerned with whether the decision was right or wrong on the basis of the evidence tendered and the Applicable Law, but with whether the decision making process was lawful or unlawful.

Whereas an appeal is concerned with a decision, )it is concerned with whether a decision was right or wrong) judicial review is concerned with the decision making process.
Chief Constable of North Wales Police V. Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155
In this case the court stated in an effort to distinguish judicial review from an appeal that the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that an individual is given fair treatment by a wide range of administrative authorities be they judicial quasi judicial or purely administrative to which the individual has been subject.  It is no part of that purpose to substitute the opinion of the judiciary or the individual judges for that of the authority constituted by law to decide the matter in question.  The consequences of finding that a decision or a decision was unlawful, and the consequences of finding that the decision making process was unlawful, improper or flawed is that it is invalidated.  This means in the case of Judicial Review, that the court can order a decision to be made again but the second time, it must be made in accordance with the law.  Please note that it would be acceptable for the decision maker to come to the same conclusion provided the law is respected.

Mirugi Kariuki V. Attorney General [

The Appellant was charged with Treason.  He petition the Attorney General to grant leave to an English Barrister to lead his defence.  In the exercise of his absolute discretion to consider such a request conferred by Section 11 of the Advocates Act, the Attorney General wrote a letter to the Appellant saying that leave would not be granted because the Appellant’s trial was straight forward and would not require the assistance of a foreign advocate.  In an application for Certiorari to quash the Attorney General’s decision, the court found that the grounds on which the Attorney General’s grounds were founded were suspicious. The Court removed the offending letter to the High Court quashed it and directed the Attorney General to reconsider Mr. Kariuki’s request in a manner more respectful to the norms of sound administration.

The point is that even if the law was not followed in the first place, the court can order that body to reconsider the matter.

With Appeals, if there is a right of appeal and an appeal succeeds, the Appellate Court will substitute its own decision for that of the inferior tribunal and dispose of the case accordingly.

Another attribute of appeal is that it is granted by statute.  Unless a statute expressly allows appeal, an aggrieved party cannot lodge an appeal against a decision.  In cases where appeals are allowed against administrative decisions or actions, the relevant law will expressly state that Appeal is allowed.  On the other hand in judicial review, the court exercises inherent powers, which gives it authority to review unlawful decisions.  In other words, there need not be express statutory provisions authorising the High Court to exercise judicial review over an administrative decision, or an administrative action.
Please note that even if a statute specifically excludes appeal to a Higher Court, this does not bar the High Court from exercising powers of judicial review.
 
Note the distinction between Appeals and Judicial Review.


EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSES/ OUSTER CLAUSES
These are those statutory provisions that will purport to exclude Judicial Review.  They appear in various forms and one way for example would as follows “the award of the industrial court shall not be questioned or reviewed by any court” S. 17(2) Trade Disputes Act.  This provision ousts the powers of the High Court to Review the decision of the administrative body.  SEE Kenya Airways Limited V. Kenya Airways Pilots Association H.C. Nai. Misc App No. 254 of 2001

The ouster clauses also appear in form of finality clauses i.e. “decision of this body is final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any court.”  A Statute may also say that the decision of this body shall not be questioned in any legal proceedings. When such clauses appear, does it necessarily mean that the court cannot inquire into a decision through judicial review?  The answer is simple it is important to note that if such statutory provisions were interpreted literally it would mean that an aggrieved person is bound by the decision of an administrative body however unlawful that decision is.  Literally it would mean that no court is entitled to go behind that decision by way of judicial review.  However, the attitude of the courts and the practice especially in Kenya show a trend that courts will disregard such provisions in other words courts will disregard ouster clauses and proceed to review administrative decisions and administrative actions.

In almost every case, the practice is that the courts will regardless of such ouster clauses review an administrative decision.

The general attitude of judges, which includes judges in this countries and others is that access to the courts can only be excluded by very clear words to that effect and that even where those very clear words are present, those statutory provisions purporting to deny access to justice (ouster clauses) will as far as possible be interpreted in favour of the citizen.  This point is illustrated in an English Case

Re Gilmores Application (1957) 1 QB 574

Lord Denning state “The remedy of Certiorari is never to be taken away by any statute except by the most clear and explicit words.  The word ‘final’ is not enough.  That only means without appeal. It does not mean without recourse to Certiorari.  It makes the decision final on the facts but not final on the law.  Notwithstanding that the decision is by a statute made final, Certiorari can still issue for excess of jurisdiction or for error on the face of the record.  If tribunals were to be at liberty to exceed their jurisdiction without any checks by the courts, the rule of law would be at an end.”

By extrapolation this rule of Lord Denning would apply to Mandamus and Prohibition
In Kenya the High Court has ruled that where there is an ouster clause, for example the one appearing in Section 17(2) of the Trade Disputes Act, the High Court nevertheless has jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of an administrative body if anyone or more of the grounds of the judicial review are present.  The best case that illustrates this is

Kenya Airways Limited V. Kenya Airline Pilot Association

Sunday, 8 February 2015

Illegally Obtained Evidence. Kenyan Evidence Law

Evidence which is obtained by means or acts which are illegal or against the law.

How does a court faced with illegally obtained evidence deal with the evidence, for example evidence obtained in violation of the constitution?  It could also be evidence obtained in breach of other statutes

A common way in which evidence is obtained illegally is through illegal searches and illegal seizures e.g. breaking into somebody’s house and obtaining evidence, through deception, threats, bribes inducement or trickery.

The issue has to be looked at in two ways
1.                  Section 20 of Police Act
2.                  Section 118 of Criminal Procedure Code

S. 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code deals with the power that is given to search places.  The power that a Magistrate or police officer may be permitted to search any place, building, ship, aircraft, vehicle, box or receptacle but they have to do this through a certain procedure i.e. Search warrant.  Essentially if you search and find something you are allowed to seize it.  It could be a thing or document.  If you do not have a search warrant the search may be said to be illegal.

Section 20 of the Police Act empowers police officers investigating offences to search any place that they believe has material necessary for the purposes of the investigation. The requirement to get a search warrant may be dispensed with in instances where a police officer believes that the process of getting the warrant is going to cause unreasonable delay.   In these instances what is required is that the officer should record in writing the basis upon which they form the opinion that if they go looking for a search warrant there is going to be inordinate delay.

There are two approaches to illegally obtained evidence
1.                  Mandatory inclusion;
2.                  Mandatory Exclusion

Under common law jurisprudence there is mandatory inclusion whereas under US Jurisprudence there is Mandatory Exclusion.

In common law the status is accurately represented by the following words  “it matters not how you get it, if you steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence” statement by Justice Crompton in R V. Leatham The only exception that is entertained under common law is where the evidence consists of a confession which has been obtained in consequence of some inducement or oppression. Even though Crompton says it does not matter how you get it, it will matter if there is inducement or oppression.

A confession that is obtained as a consequence of the deception or inducement of the person confessing is not admissible even though it be relevant.  E.g. a confession made to a colleague to a person in jail has been held not to be confessed to a person in authority.

In civil cases there is no discretion to exclude admissible evidence.  But even in criminal cases there is a conflict between 2 positions i.e. where you admit all relevant evidence to ensure that the guilty are punished and then there is the view that to admit improperly obtained evidence condones and encourages impropriety on the part of the police.  i.e. why go through proper channels if you can obtain evidence illegally.   There is no provision in the Evidence Act to guide us.  For instance if somebody got evidence through phone tapping is it admissible?

We look to the constitution which protects persons against being subjected to the search of their person or property without their consent.  It also protects against entry to your property by others without your consent.

Under common law, there is the proposition that all relevant evidence is admissible regardless of the fact that it was obtained illegally. Is this a good way to view evidence in light of sometimes the excesses that police can be prone to?  A person may be accused but they still have certain rights.  It is better that 99 guilty people go free than one innocent person to be found guilty.  It is much better that one occasional criminal go free than to condone illegal procuring of evidence.  

Evidence which is relevant to a fact in issue is relevant no matter how it was obtained.

Lloyd V. Mostyn 1842 10 M&W 478 where Chief Justice Goddard says that the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue.  If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained.  This case was quoted with approval in the case of Kuruma s/o Kaniu v. R 1955 1 AELR 236  The Appellant was convicted with being in unlawful possession of two rounds of ammunition contrary to Regulation 8 of the emergency regulations of 1952.  Under the Emergency Regulations only a police officer or an officer above the rank of assistant inspector was empowered to stop and search an individual.  The appellant was an employee of a European settler farmer and had been granted leave of absence to go to his rural home in the reserve.  He was stopped at a roadblock, a police constable stopped him and on searching him found him with the two rounds of ammunition and a penknife.  3 persons witnessed the search but were not called to testify.  The accused was charged and convicted of this capital offence and sentenced to death.  He appealed contending that the evidence used to convict him was illegally obtained.  The court held that the evidence was properly obtained in line with Justice Crompton statement in Lloyd v. Mostyn.

King V. R   1969 1 AC 304


Police obtained a search warrant to search a house belonging to one Joyce Cohen looking for Ganja and this was under the Dangerous Drugs Act.  They read the warrant to Joyce Cohen but apart from Joyce Cohen, there was the Appellant in Joyce Cohen’s House when the police came and they did not read the warrant to the visitor.  The police however searched the appellant and another man in the house and they found the appellant with the drug.  The Appellant was tried and convicted for possession of dangerous drugs and he appealed arguing that the warrant was not directly read to him and thus he was not legally searched.  The court should have excluded the evidence found on his person because the evidence was unfair to him. The court held that there was no way of interfering with the way in which the court exercised its discretion and the court went further to say that this was not a case in which evidence had been obtained by conduct which was irreprehensible insinuating that if the conduct had been irreprehensible the court would have allowed the appeal.  There was a bit of discussion about constitutional rights concerning illegal searches. 

The court in R V. King referred to the case of R v Payne [1963] 1 AER 848  Where illegally obtained evidence was excluded but it refused to be guided by this case.  The facts of this case are that the defendant was taken to a police station following a traffic accident.  He was asked whether he wanted to see a doctor, he agreed to see a doctor.  At no time had he been told that the results of the examination might be used in evidence against him.  It was not made clear to him that the doctor would enquire on whether he was fit to drive.  At the trial for drunk driving the doctor gave evidence that the driver was driving under the influence of alcohol and the defendant was convicted.  He appealed.  The appeal court quashed the conviction on the ground that even though the evidence was admissible, had the accused realised that the doctor would give evidence on the matter of driving under the influence of alcohol, he might have refused to submit himself for examination and in refusing to be guided by this case, the court in King v R stated that there was no evidence in the King’s case of oppressive conduct or trickery on the part of the police.  The court essentially seems to be saying that illegality is graded, ie. That there is illegality that can be allowed to pass but there are cases when it is reprehensible.

Jeffrey V. Black [1978] QB 490 The defendant was arrested by 2 police officers of the drug squad for stealing a sandwich from a public house.  The officer improperly searched his home and found Cannabis and the defendant was subsequently charged with possession of drugs.  The accused put up in his  defence that his house was searched illegally.  The first court ruled out the evidence of the search as inadmissible having been illegally obtained.  The prosecution appealed and the appeal was allowed.  The Appeal court held
1.                  That the mere fact that evidence is obtained in an irregular fashion does not of itself prevent that evidence from being relevant and acceptable to court;
2.                  Any court has the discretion to decline to allow any evidence brought by the prosecution if they think it will be unfair or oppressive to allow it.

R V. Sang [1979] 2 AER P 1222

The Appellant was charged with conspiracy to utter forged US Bank Notes.  He pleaded not guilty before the case opened.  Counsel for the Appellant applied for a trial within a trial to show that the Appellant had been induced to commit the offence by a police informer acting on the instructions of the police.  The appellant was averring that for the inducement, he would not have committed the offence.  Counsel was hoping to persuade the judge to exercise his discretion to disallow the evidence of the commission of the offence.  The Judge however ruled that he had no discretion to exclude the evidence.  The appellant changed his plea to guilty and was convicted and sentenced.  He appealed against the judgment and the appeal was allowed by the court of appeal and then the state appealed to the House of Lord.  The House of Lord held that
1.                  A Judge in a criminal trial always has discretion to refuse to admit evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value;
2.                  Except in the case of admissions, confessions and evidence obtained from an accused after the commission of an offence, a Judge has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant admissible evidence merely because it had been obtained by improper and unfair means.
3.                  The use by the police of an agent provocateur or an informer to obtain evidence was not a ground on which the discretion should be exercised. Such a factor may however be considered in mitigating the sentence imposed on the accused.
4.                  The defence of entrapment had no place in English Law and could not be accepted by a Judge as a ground for exercising the discretion to exclude the prosecution’s evidence of the commission of the crime.

It would appear that the R v. Sang articulates the common law stand succinctly if evidence is relevant to a fact in issue it is admissible provided it is not obtained under inducement, confession or after the commission of an offence.  The common law position is almost the opposite of the position which exists in the US Today.  The US Jurisprudence tries to run away from the law.  The law that is used to exclude illegally obtained evidence is the 4th Amendment which reads as follows:-
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, favours and effects against reasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

The question as to whether illegally obtained evidence is admissible in the US has been debatable. 

Weeks V. United States 232 US 283
The police went to defendant’s house without warrant, they searched and took possession of various papers and articles that they found in that house and these were turned over to the courts.  The police later went to the premises hoping to get more evidence and carried away more letters and this second search was also without a warrant.  The whole question as to whether evidence obtained by the police and the prosecutor was admissible was discussed and the judges stated “if letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offence, the protection of the 4th Amendment is of no value.”
This was a Supreme Court Decision .

In Wolf V. Colorado it was suggested that there was need for a uniform rule, even after the Weeks case the courts had continued to apply common law rules and in this case of Wolfe the court decided to have a uniform rule.

In Map V. Ohio 367 US P 643 The defendant was convicted in an Ohio state court for possession of obscene literature.  The conviction was affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeal and later by Ohio state supreme court.  The obscene materials were discovered during a search that was not subject to a warrant on the defendant’s house.  The Ohio supreme court held that evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure is admissible in a criminal prosecution. The court continued to state that under the Supreme Court of United States in Wolf v. Colorado a state was not prevented by federal constitution from adopting the rule as it prevailed in Ohio.  On appeal to the US Supreme Court it was held that as a matter of due process evidence obtained by a search and seizure in violation of the 4th amendment is inadmissible in a state court as it is in a federal court.  If the supreme court holds evidence to be inadmissible it should apply across the board.

The US Courts have gone even further and held that even if the evidence is not obtained illegally, where such evidence is obtained in such a manner as to be reprehensible according to the spirit of the constitution, such evidence shall not be admissible.  Note the importance that jurisprudence attaches to people’s rights.


In Kenya the reigning position is that in Kuruma s/o Kaniu v. R.   This Case has been criticised in the context within which it was decided.  It was decided during emergency regulation times not withstanding provisions of S. 76 of the Constitution.   The position seems to be that the end justifies the means.

Rule Against Hearsay

RULE AGAINST HEARSAY
By Duncan Otieno 'Nairobi University'(Law School)
Hearsay refers to testimony given in court by a person other than the one who perceived it. As a general rule hearsay is inadmissible. For you start from the premise that reporting in court what you heard another person say is not going to be admitted in court as evidence. And this draws from section 63 of the Evidence Act, which explicitly provides that oral evidence must be direct. So you are not allowed to go to court to say this is what another person said. Oral evidence must be direct. And when you are dealing with documents it is going to be required that the author of the document presents that document in court. And the reason that we are saying that the author of the document should come to court is so that if you want to cross-examine them you have the opportunity to cross-examine them.

The rule against hearsay is stated as follows: ”A statement made by a person not called as a witness which is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the fact contained in the statement is hearsay and it is not admissible. If however the statement is offered in evidence, not to prove the truth of the facts contained in the statement but only to prove that the statement was in fact made it is not hearsay and it is admissible”- Justice De Silva

So essentially then what determines whether hearsay is hearsay or not is going to be pegged around the purpose for which the statement is given. If you are giving the statement to prove the truth of the contents of the statement, you are giving the statement made by another person seeking to get people to believe that which is contained in the statement, that is hearsay. But on the other hand if you state what another person said, not to prove the truth but to establish that those people actually made the statement, that is not hearsay. Because essentially then what you are doing is just reporting what another person said and you did perceive of what that other person said because you heard them. Is this clear?

When you are using the statement to prove that the statement was made, here you are attesting to something that you perceived of because you heard it had taken place. But where you are giving a statement to prove the truth of what was contained in the statement which somebody else had perceived of, that is hearsay. So for instance if a person comes and says, James told me Peter stole the till from the bank. If you are trying to prove the fact that Peter stole from the bank then you can see there that you will not have direct perception of what happened. If in fact you did hear James say that Peter stole, you perceived of that fact because you did hear James say that Peter stole. Is that clear?

The case that you should read that concerns this rule of hearsay is the case of Subramanium v Public Prosecutor (1956) WLR 965. And the facts of this case were as follows: The appellant was charged and convicted of being in possession of firearms without lawful excuse. In his defence, he asserted that he was acting under duress in consequence or a result of threats uttered to him by Malayan terrorists. When he attempted to state the contents of the threats, he was overruled by the judge. He appealed against conviction arguing that the judge should actually have listened to what the import of the threat was. And of course the judge would have argued that if he was allowed to say what the terrorists had told him that would be hearsay. The court of appeal held that the conviction had to be quashed because what the terrorists told the appellant should have been admitted as original or direct evidence. It would have shed light on subsequent actions of the appellant.

So essentially here what the court is saying is that the appellant should have been allowed to utter the threat because they would not have been threatening-may be he was told if you don’t fire the firearm we will kill your mother. So the fact that the statement was uttered is one thing, but the truth of what was in the statement is another thing. Whether the terrorists had the capacity to kill his mother or whatever else they threatened to do is not what we are seeking to hear. What we are seeking to find out is whether a reasonable person would have behaved in the same way as the appellant did in the circumstances. And you should note in this case the statement I was reading to you on what is hearsay and what is not hearsay was stated. In the judgment of Justice De Silva at page 959 to 970. That is where that statement that we are talking about, what is and what is not hearsay is stated by this particular judge:

”A statement made by a person not called as a witness which is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the fact contained in the statement is hearsay and it is not admissible. If however the statement is offered in evidence, not to prove the truth of the facts contained in the statement but only to prove that the statement was in fact made it is not hearsay and it is admissible”

The other case that we should look at getting to what is hearsay is the case of Myers v DPP 1964 2 All ER 881. This is a case you must read. The appellant in this case was charged and convicted of receiving a stolen motor vehicle. He was in the business of buying wrecked motor vehicles for repair and resale. The chief prosecution witness was the person in charge of the records department of the relevant motor vehicle factory. He testified that every time that a car was manufactured a workman would note down the engine number and the chassis number of the car amongst other details and these would be marked on some card. He also testified that the cylinder head number would be indelibly struck on the cylinder head block so as to be inerasable. The card would then be microfilmed and stored. At the trial the microfilms were produced on oath by the witness and schedules were prepared from this microfilm. The schedules showed that the cylinder block numbers of the car in question belonged to the car allegedly stolen. The appellant was convicted on the basis of this evidence. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction and the appellant appealed to the House of Lords. The House of Lords held that the trial court and the court of appeal improperly admitted hearsay evidence in the form of the microfilm and Lord Reid at page 884 stated: “The witness would only say that a record made by someone else showed that if the record was correctly made a car had left the workshop bearing three particular numbers. He could not prove that the record was correct or the numbers which it contained were in fact the numbers on the car when it was made.”

Do you see the argument here? That essentially the basis of the microfilm was not something that the witness could testify to because he did not put in the particular entry. He did not actually author the document. Remember we said by dint of section 63 of the Evidence Act, the person that authors the document should produce that document. So here the vehicle had left the workshop with some numbers. Those had now been reduced into microfilm and you have a third person seeking to produce that as evidence. And essentially what the court is saying here is that the only thing the witness can say is that some record had been made of a car that left with some numbers. But he could not actually vouch for the veracity of the truth of what was contained in those documents. And for that reason, that was hearsay. This is why we are saying the House of Lords said the trial court and the court of appeal had improperly admitted hearsay evidence. And because this became a bit technical, Lord Reid ends his statement by saying:

”This is a highly technical point but the law regarding hearsay evidence is technical and I would say absurdly technical”

The other case that it would be a good thing to look at just to illustrate how hearsay presents itself, is the case of Patel v Comptroller of Customs [1965] 3 All ER 593. The appellant here imported from Singapore into Fiji some coriander seeds shipped in bags. He correctly engrossed (filled) the customs import entry form and on investigation at arrival five bags of what he had imported were found to be contained in within another outer bag. So essentially here you have double bagging. The outer bag of these five bags was marked with the appellant’s trade name but it had marked on it “Produce of Morocco”. In the important entry form the appellant had filled that the coriander was a product of India. So in respect of the five bags that had “Produce of Morocco”, the appellant was charged and convicted in making a false declaration in a customs import form, on a customs import entry. And we are saying that he had stated that the seed originated from India when in fact it originated from Morocco.

On appeal, it was held that the evidence of the writing on the bag was inadmissible. It was hearsay. And this was because the court could not ascertain that in essence the coriander seed had actually come from morocco even though the bags were marked “Produce of Morocco”. There were actually saying nobody knew who and when those markings on the bags, Produce of Morocco, were made.  And essentially then nobody could speak to them testifying to the fact that the particular coriander seed had originated from Morocco.  So they could not be the basis of conviction for making a false entry because the person who wrote them could not be called to vouch for the truth.

The other case that would illustrate the same point is Junga v R (1952) AC 480 (PC). The accused was charged and convicted with the offence of being armed with the intent to commit a felony. The police witness gave evidence at the trial, saying that they had been told by a police informer of the alleged attempted offence. The informer was not called to give evidence and his identify was not revealed. The accused was convicted. On appeal it was held that the trial magistrate had before him hearsay evidence of a very damaging kind. Without the hearsay evidence the court below could not have found the necessary intent to commit a felony and that being the case the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against conviction. Given that here was hearsay evidence, you didn’t call the informer who would have actually given first hand knowledge of the fact that led to the conviction of this person. And that being the case, the Court of Appeal says that in all fairness the conviction should be quashed.

Another case is the case of Tenywa v Uganda (1967) EA 102(U). The accused was accused of having stolen a bicycle. The bicycle was seized by police officers acting on this information. On examination the bicycle was found to have a forged number plate. The accused was convicted of the offence but appealed and on appeal it was held that the police report from Kampala suggesting that the original number on the bicycle was altered was hearsay. It should not have been admitted. Because essentially there was nobody to say this was the number. When you say there was a fake number on the bicycle you are basically saying that it is not the number that was on it, so you should have a person to testify to what was actually the original number. But just to say that it has been changed, even saying that what has been found is what was. Because essentially the person that marked the number on the bicycle was not called to give evidence.

The learned trial magistrate was wrong in law to have admitted in evidence the report alleged to have been obtained from Kampala, which suggested that the original number of the (stolen) bicycle had been altered.  That piece of evidence was hearsay and should not have been admitted… unless the expert who had examined the bicycle had testified before the court and been cross-examined on the point as to how he arrived at his conclusion.

Over and above those cases you should also look at the cases of

Magoti s/o Matofali v R (1953) EACA 232.

“A plan of the locus … was made and produced in evidence by a police corporal.  Various points on the plan are marked with letters and it bears a legend showing what these points represent… as to what each point represented he merely said ‘I got the information from Antonia, (P.W. 2), as to positions and ownership.’ ‘This, of course, was merely hearsay and his evidence should have been supported by the evidence of the witness Antonia to the effect that she had, subsequent to the event, pointed out to the corporal the places where the various incidents, to which she had testified, had taken place.”

R v Gutasi s/o Wamagale (1936) 14 EACA 232

“We note that the statement made by the appellant (Ex.P.1) to Mr. Harwich, Superintendent of Police, was admitted, although the two interpreters who had carried out a double interpretation were not called as witnesses.  Without their evidence this statement was strictly inadmissible since Mr. Harwich could only speak to have taken down what he was told by the second interpreter.”

Waugh v R (1950) AC 203 (PC).

And basically these cases also discuss instances where courts are faced with hearsay evidence and how they treat them. And it would be useful to read those to begin to understand what kind of information, the court is really going to take into account in determining whether a particular piece of evidence is hearsay or not. And essentially that is about the rule, that is you should not go to court to say what you heard another person say to establish the truth of that which you are saying.

There are exceptions to the hearsay rule and actually the exceptions are many more than the rule itself:

1. the first one would be admissions, formal and informal admissions. And these are covered at sections 17-24

2. confessions are another exception to the hearsay rule covered at sections 25-52

3. thirdly, statements made by persons who cannot be called as witnesses are an exception to the hearsay rule. And these are laid out at section 33 of the Evidence Act.

4. evidence given in previous judicial proceedings is also an exception to the hearsay rule. And that is covered at section 34 of the Evidence Act.

5. statements made under special circumstances are also an exception to the hearsay rule. And a number of these are laid out in from section 37 through to 41.

6. statements in documents produced in civil proceedings are also an exception to the hearsay rule. Section 35 and 36

7. Res Gestae is also an exception to the hearsay rule.

8. affidavit statements especially where they are based on information are also an exception to the hearsay rule.

9. statements taken from sick persons who are about to die are also an exception to the hearsay rule. And these are hazards(?) under the Criminal Procedure Code.

10. And also evidence by certificate covered at sections 77 and 78.

We will begin by looking at statements made by persons who cannot be called as witnesses:

Statements by persons who cannot be called as witnesses
Section 33 lays out what those statements might be. It actually has 8 examples of such statements and these are all, in their own right, exceptions to the hearsay rule. And therefore I could not agree more with Lord Reid that the rule against hearsay is technical and absurdly technical.

The opening paragraph at section 33 gives the context within which those exceptions covered at that section apply:

“Statements, written or oral, of admissible facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence or whose attendance cannot be procured, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which in the circumstances of the case appears to the court unreasonable, are themselves admissible in the following cases-“

So it is not all the time that you have, for instance, under section 33 (a) a dying declaration or whatever else, that it is going to be used in evidence. What is detailed at section 33 introduction will have to apply.

So essentially the statement will be admissible if the person make them is dead, cannot be found, has become incapable of giving evidence, their attendance cannot be procured. Or even if it can be procured that would actually occasion expense and delay which in the view of the court is unreasonable. If those circumstances apply then  (a), (b), through to eight would be admitted. Is it clear?

So each of these eight exceptions there is that rider: cannot be found, is dead, the attendance cannot be procured without delay or cannot be procured at all. So if it is alleged that a person is dead, do you think that this statement that a person is dead, is enough? It is not. The fact of the death has to be ascertained.  How do you prove that a person is dead? By a death certificate, the presumption of death, by people who participated in their burial can be called to testify to the fact of death. But essentially the fact of death is a fact that needs to be proved until you have proved that the person is dead through the screening, then you couldn’t actually bring any of these statements  …. And if a person cannot be found the fact of not being found must relate to the time that he is required to give evidence. So you cannot just say that you have not been seeing the person…if no effort has been made to procure them to come and give evidence. So the fact of not being found must relate to time during which you are sought to give evidence.

And the authority for this supposition is the case R v Ndolo (1926) 10 KLR 11.

The court considered the meaning of “cannot be found” in connection with S. 33 India Evidence Act and Section 34 of Kenya Evidence Act where the language is identical.  Here the witness left his place of employment and was not served with a summons for the date of the trial.  The trial was adjourned and assistance from the Registration Department was of no avail, as his movements could not be traced.  It was contended that his deposition should be read.  The defence argued tht has the prosecution taken reasonable steps to discover his whereabouts in preparation for the first date of hearing he would have been available.  The court held that the words “cannot be found” refer to the time when the witness is sought to to attend the trial, and do not refer to the state of affairs at some earlier period.  There was no question as to whether the search had been a diligent one, and the words appear to imply that such a diligent search should be required before the condition is held to have been fulfilled.

And also the case of Thomhill v Thornhill (1965) EA 268 (CA), would be authority for the proposition that the fact of not being found has to be proximate to the time you require the person to give evidence.
What is an unreasonable delay, or unreasonable expense is a matter within the discretion of the court, dependent upon the circumstances of a particular case.
In this case “the learned trial judge also stated in his judgment that the cost and inconvenience of bringing a witness from the United Kingdom would not be great in these days of rapid and inexpensive air travel.  With great respect, I disagree that air travel in these days is inexpensive, although I agree that it is rapid.  But the question seems to be this – is it justifiable legally to put the petitioner to the expense of bringing a witness from the United Kingdom to testify about a fact which is not denied and in respect of whose evidence the court has a discretion to accept on affidavit, particularly as the petition is not defended and no application was made to have the witness orally examined?”

Having satisfied those introductory matters, the first category of statements made by persons who cannot be called as witnesses, are dying declarations. Section 33(a)states:

“when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question and such statements are admissible whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question;”

So when the cause of death of a person is in issue and this could be in either civil or criminal proceedings, the statement made by such a person which deals with the circumstances of the cause of the death is going to be relevant. And the case to look at here is the case of Terikabi v Uganda (1975) EA 60. The deceased in this case gave or made a statement giving the cause of his death but no evidence of the circumstances relating to the death. And of course the question was: would this be admissible? Because essentially people are looking at it as being that he has to give both cause and circumstances. So this case was testing whether if a statement gave only cause, would it be admissible? If it gave only circumstances but no cause, would it be admissible? And the court here held that the statement was admissible, that it was not necessary that the statement refer to both the cause and circumstances. Mention of either cause or circumstances was sufficient.

In certain jurisdictions it is required that for a dying declaration to be admissible the person making it must have haven in imminent expectation of death. And the assumption here is that if you are in imminent expectation of death, you are unlikely to tell lies because you are expecting to be going to your maker and you do not want to go tainted by untruth. But of course you know that it fallacious as well because you may be revengeful against a particular person that you do not mind if after you are dead they spend all their lives behind bars, accused of having killed you. In Kenya, however that is not a requirement. So it is not required in this country that for a dying declaration to be admissible one would have to be in imminent expectation f death. And that is actually contained at section 33(a), if you look at the sentence beginning, “such statements are admissible whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death..”.

And the case to look at here is a case that we will look at again when we look at confessions. The case of Swami v King-Emperor (1939) 1 All ER 396 (PC). In this case the court considered the admissibility of evidence by a widow that the deceased had told her that he was going to a particular place on the invitation of the appellant’s wife and that the appellant’s wife had asked the deceased to go and receive payment of his dues at that place. So the court was considering whether evidence of a statement by a widow that the deceased had told her he was going to a particular place on the invitation of the appellant’s wife to pick up payment of his dues. And this statement was held to be admissible even though it was made before the cause of death had arisen. So the deceased here was not in imminent expectation of death. But they had made a statement that shed light into the circumstances that led to the death  that he was going to pick up his due.

Again on the same point you should look at the case of Kaluma v R (1968)EAR 349. In this case, three appellants were convicted of the murder of two women in Kenya. The three appellants happened to be wanted by the Uganda police and the two women they were accused of having murdered were part of a search party which had been sent to Kenya to find and arrest the appellants. Evidence was admitted at the trial that one of the two women had made inquiries about the appellants whereabouts and this had been reported to the appellants. This evidence was admitted on the grounds that it was relevant as to the motive or reason for the murder. The appellants were convicted and they appealed challenging the admission of the evidence about the inquiries and the court held that evidence about the inquiries was admissible under section 33 of the Kenya Evidence Act as a statement made by a person who is dead as to the circumstances of the transaction, which resulted in the death. So it was not in the category that would be hearsay and inadmissible. It was an exception to the hearsay rule. So the person was dead and under section 33 (a) a statement made by a person who is dead on the circumstances of their death would be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
So essentially then what would be the requirement under section 33 (a) for admission of a statement as a dying declaration:

1. it has to relate to the cause and or circumstance of the death of the maker and not to any other person. So it has to relate to your death as the maker of the statement, not to the death of other people. And the authority for that preposition is the case of Mohamed Warsama v R.(1956) 23 EACA 576. In this case the deceased had made a series of dying declarations which were precise and detailed and if true conclusive. He had in his declaration also stated the cause of death of another person and the question was whether that part of the dying declaration that identified another person was admissible. And the court held, no,  it was not admissible. The question was whether that part of the dying declaration that pointed to the cause of death of another person was admissible. Remember we said that the deceased made many dying declarations of a precise and detailed and if true conclusive. But in those dying declarations did not just talk about the cause of his own death. He actually talked about the cause of death of another person. And the court was enquiring as to whether that part of the statement that talked about the cause of death of the other person was admissible. And the court held, no. the  dying declaration has to related to the cause and or circumstances of the death of the maker, not of other people. So they would admit what was pertaining to his death, not to the death of other people.

2. The second rule is that the statement must be proximate to the death. So if you had made a statement about your death in the year 2000 and then you die this year, the whole question of the proximity of the statement to your death is going to arise. And the authority here is Antonio v Barugahare v R (1957) EA 149 (CA). The witness here had given evidence that the deceased woman had told her six weeks earlier before she died that the accused had asked her to marry him. So the deceased had confided to the witness, six weeks prior to her death, that the accused had asked her to marry him. The deceased had also asked the deceased according to the report to lend him money to pay his tax. She had refused to yield to either demand. And she was found dead six weeks later. And the question was whether what she had confided to the witness was a dying declaration. Was the information that he had passed to the witness, that she had been asked to marry the accused and lend him money a dying declaration. The court held, not, it was not a dying declaration because the facts alleged were not proximate or related to the death and the circumstances were not those of the transaction resulting in the death. You should compare that holding to the holding of the case R v  Kabateleine s/o Nchwaba (1946) 13 EACA 164. In this case, a complaint made by a deceased person to her headman two days before the house in which she was sleeping was burned, was held directly related to the occasion of the deceased’s death and was a circumstance that resulted in her relevant. Essentially here you are looking at two days and 50. So while six weeks are seen as not proximate, not close enough, here the complaint had been done two days earlier and that is the duration between the complaint and when the death occurred, is what makes the ruling that it is part of the transaction that resulted in death.

3. The dying declaration must be complete. And we should here revisit the case of Beddington. You should also look at the case of Waugh v R (1950) AC 203 (PC). R v Beddington (?), you looked at that when we were looking at res gestae or was it similar facts?   In Waugh’s case, the declaration was held to be inadmissible because it was not complete on its face. The deceased in this case fell in a terminal comma when he was making the statement leaving it incomplete. So basically what the court is saying is that you don’t know what the person might have said if they had had the opportunity to complete the statement, and for that reason, being incomplete, then you could not say it is a statement that should be admitted. The same point is made in the case of R V. Charles Daki s/o Daki (1960) EAR 34. The deceased was in this case admitted into hospital suffering from gun shot wounds. When he was asked who shot him, he said, “Charles Daki has killed me, he shot me with a gun. I saw him with a gun. He was on a motorcycle. A friend of mine had visited me and I went to the garage with him.” At this point the doctor intervened and the deceased died subsequently. Daki was charged and convicted on the basis of the statement, despite his counsel’s objection. On appeal the statement was held inadmissible on the grounds that the deceased might or might not have added something… And essentially because this statement was not complete, on appeal it was held that this statement could not be used as basis of conviction because for a dying declaration to be admissible it had to be a complete statement. For example, if he had stopped at,”Charles Daki killed me. He shot me with a gun.” And then he did not express willingness or desire to say other things. Basically he had gone on to say—he was now going off on a tangent. What was he going to say when he said a friend visited him, we went to the garage? May be the friend started quarreling with Charles Daki…nobody knows what this person wanted to say… which means the statement was incomplete because you don’t know what he might have said if he had not expired at that point. Let us also look at the case of Pius Jasunga s/o Akumu v R (1954) 21 EACA 331. In this case, a witness who was an assistant police inspector gave evidence that he saw the deceased lying on the road with a wound in his chest. When asked who had injured him the deceased replied, ‘Pius Jasunga had stabbed me’. Later at the hospital, the deceased made a statement to the superintendent of police during the cause of which he got weaker and weaker and he was unable to sign the statement. There was no corroboration of this story and it had been made in the absence of the accused by a man who was suffering from a terrible wound, from which he died subsequently. And the court here held that even though as a rule of law it is not required that a dying declaration should be corroborated, as a matter of practice you should not convict on uncorroborated dying declaration, even though as a matter of law there is no requirement that there be corroboration or independent credible evidence fortifying a particular statement, and in this case a dying declaration. There is no requirement of law. But here one of the points they noted was that as a matter of practice the court should always require corroboration. And they said that the weight of a dying declaration that is made in circumstances suggesting that the person might have said something more, must be less than the one that is fully made.  A dying declaration that is made in circumstances that suggest that the person may have said other things but he was prevented from saying those other things because he expired, the weight attached to that dying declaration must essentially be less than one that appears to be complete. And over and above that the principle that even though law will not require you to corroborate a dying declaration, as a matter of practice the court should always require that such be corroborated. And that is going to be the final requirement of a dying declaration. A dying declaration requires corroboration as a matter of practice. When you look at rules on corroboration, you will see that the law on evidence requiring corroboration is generally divided into two. There are those circumstances where the law actually requires that you get corroboration. Like when you have evidence of children of tender years. There are a number of cases where the law requires that—I think evidence of the complainant in rape case is required by law to be corroborated. But over and above that, courts in exercising caution—and again being guided by the need to be fair to the accused person—have devised instances where even though the law does not require corroboration they will ordinarily require corroboration. And a good example is where you have a dying declaration. That a dying declaration should not form the basis of conviction if it is not corroborated and corroboration here is talking to bringing in credible, independent, strong evidence to fortify that which is being state in the evidence requiring corroboration. It is also required for confessions that are repudiated or retracted, where a person has made a confession and they later say that either they never made it or that they only made it because they were tortured or they were coerced into making it. That kind of confession, even should the court the court decide to admit it, it will ordinarily as a matter of practice required that it be corroborated.

Statements made in the ordinary course of business

The second category of statements under section 33 are statements made in the ordinary course of business.
Section 33(b) states:

“when the statement was made by such person in the ordinary course of business, and in particular when it consists of an entry or memorandum made by him in books or records kept in the ordinary course of business or in the discharge of professional duty; or of an acknowledgement written or signed by him of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property of any kind; or of a document used in commerce, written or signed by him, or of the date of a letter or other document usually dated, written or signed by him.”

So for a statement to satisfy the requirements of 33(b) it has to be a statement being in the ordinary course of business. And section 33 (b) gives examples of those to include entries or memorandum in books or records, and these have to be regularly kept. For instance, books of account, ledgers, journals. It could also be acknowledgements that are written and signed for the receipt of money, receipt books, or documents used in commerce. These would be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. And the assumption here is that the person making them has no motivation to falsify them. They are kept in the ordinary course of business; they would actually be entered. But remember in the case of Myers v the DPP what seems to have been record that were kept in the ordinary cause of business were actually ruled to be hearsay because the person making them did not actually come to testify to them. And this is again to talk to the introductory part of section 33, that it has to be that the person is dead, cannot be found, is incapable of giving evidence, cannot be procured or even they can be procured it will be as a consequence of delay and expense which is unreasonable. So in Myers v the DPP it was not established that a person had died, or could not be found. So essentially for this book to be admissible it is not for all time. The exception comes in because what is contained at the introduction at section 33 is already applicable, that there is a problem in getting this person here because they are dead, etc.

And the cases to look at there are

Commissioner of Customs v SK Panachand (1961) EA 303 (CA)

The company imported some blankets allegedly from West Germany, No import licence was required for goods from West Germany, although a licence was required for goods from other countries.  The Customs seized the blankets acting on information that they, in fact, had come from East Germany.  The company, seeking the return of the blankets, in order to support its case produced two documents, an invoice, and a document signed by a Mr. Blok in which it was stated that the invoice, on which appeared the words “Country of Origin – West Germany”, was correct.  The Company claimed that these documents satisfied the burden placed upon the Customs Acts, i.e. to prove the country of origin of the blankets.

The decision involved S. 33 of Evidence Act covering cases where the attendance of a witness cannot be procured without unreasonable delay and expense, subs. (b) dealing with statements or documents made in the ordinary course of business.  The main issue was whether the invoice and document signed by Mr. Blok were admissible in evidence to prove country of origin.

The court held basically that the “any person” who will “give evidence of any other fact” in this case, as set forth in S. 110 I.E.A was Mr. Blok, who by means of his signed document would give evidence of the “other fact”, i.e. that the blankets came from West Germany. Before Mr. Blok could “give evidence through the media of the documents, S. 110 placed the burden upon the Company of proving:
(a) that Mr. Blok’s attendance at the trial could not be procured without unreasonable delay of expense,
(b) that Mr. Blok’s signed document was used in the course of business, and
(c) that the document was actually signed by Mr. Blok, the person whose attendance it was unreasonable to procure.
Since the Company had failed to meet its burden of proving these conditions precedent to the admission of the documents they were held not admissible in evidence and the court ordered condemnation of the blankets.

You should also look at the case of R v Masalu (1967) EA 355 (T).

You should also look at Gichunge v R (1972) EA 546.

And all these cases would be illustrating what might be statements made in the ordinary course of business. The cases of Masalu and Gichunge are particularly interesting because they deal with post-mortem reports and would seem to indicate that fact report can technically be admitted as a statement made in the ordinary course of business if they constitute a statement of fact, rather than a statement of one’s opinion, when you are talking about the cause of death, when you are talking about either a statement of fact rather than an expression of opinion, that would be admissible.
You should also look at the case of R v Magandazi and four Others (1967) EA 84 (CA), which would also talk to documents made in the ordinary cause of business.
The accused were employed in Uganda to carry loads to the Congo.  On a charge of theft of a portion of the loads by the accused, a letter from an agent of the complainant’s firm resident in the Congo was placed in evidence, but the writer was not called.  The Court said:
“… a letter was produced … by the same witness purporting to come from the agency of the complainant’s firm in the Congo and showing shortages in the goods received.  (Section 30(2) quoted).  The provision of the Section should in my opinion be only sparingly applied and rarely, if ever, be used where the statement goes to the root of the whole matter before the Court, as in the present case.  Further the letter, although it may be said to have been written in the ordinary course of business to report a loss, appears also to be in the nature of a special letter written with a view to the present prosecution.”  The letter was not admitted.
Another case might the case of  Idi bin Ramadhan v R (1914) 2 ULR 108.
The statement of a police constable was put in evidence during the course of the trial after it had been proved that the constable in question had proceeded on leave.  Presumably the statement purported to be put in evidence under s. 32(2) of the Evidence Decree.  GRAY C.J. quoted from Magandazi’s case and from Ningawa v. Bharmappa “I think in using the phrase ‘in the ordinary course of business’ the legislature intended to admit statements similar to those, admitted in England, as coming under the same description.  The subject is clearly dealt with in Chapter XII of Mr. Pitt Taylor’s Treatise on the Law of Evidence, and the case(s) which he has collected show that this execution to the general rule against hearsay tends only to statements made during the course, not of any particular transaction of an exceptional kind such as the execution of a deed or mortgage, but of business, or professional employment in which the declarant was ordinarily or habitually engaged.  The phrase was apparently used to indicate the current routine of business which was usually followed by the person whose declaration it is sought to introduce.”

Statements against the interests of the maker

The next category of statements admissible under section 33 are statements against the interests of the maker.

Statements against the interests of the maker

Section 33 (c )  reads:

“When a statement against the pecuniary or proprietary interests of the person making it, or when, if true, it would expose him or would have exposed him to a criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages;”

So essentially a statement which is against the interests of the maker would be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. But remember against the introductory part of section 33 has to apply before you admit that it makes an exception to the hearsay rule. And over and above that you have to look at: Is it really against the interests of the maker? And the interests of the maker might be pecuniary or relating to money, proprietary where it affects property or the ownership of the property of the maker, or it could also be one that exposes a person to a claim for damages or to prosecution. And the rationale here is that in the ordinary course of life a person is not going to make a statement against their own interests and would only make such a statement if it is true.

 Case to look at is the case of Marie Ayoub v Standard Bank of SA (1961) EA 743 (CA).And the statement here was made by the deceased. There was a statement in a letter where the deceased was said to be owed for the running of his estate. A statement in a letter in which it was said that the plaintiff were indebted to the deceased for the running expenses of an estate. The question arose as to whether the statement would be an exception to the hearsay rule under section 33(c ) and it was held not admissible because the maker was not dead. The person who had made the statement saying they were indebted to the deceased for the running of the estate was not dead. So the prerequisite for the operation of section 33 (c ) had not been satisfied.

The other case you could look at is the case of Dias v R (1927) 3 Uganda Law Reports 214, where the accused was charged with the offense of falsifying books of account and the prosecution relied on a letter written by a deceased clerk to the head of the department which charged the accused with having ordered him to make the false entries. So the question was, could such a statement be admitted under section 33 (c ) as one against the interests of the maker. Who was maker of the statement here? The deceased clerk. And who was the accused?  He was not the deceased. So the court here held this statement was not proper one for section 33 (c ) equivalent to Uganda, that it could not be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule because it was in the very interest of the deceased clerk to make that statement so that he could pin responsibility on the other person rather than on himself. So it was not actually a statement against the interests of the maker because the maker was charging another person with falsifying the books and therefore it was not the right statement for the application of this exception.

The next exception at section 33 is statements expressing opinion as to a public right or custom. And remember again it is when the maker of the statement would be dead, cannot be found and all those things that are contained in the introductory. So statements made by persons who cannot be called as witnesses are admissible if they give an opinion on the existence of custom and for such to be admissible the people ought to be a person that might be aware of such right or custom and the statement should been made before any controversy as to the right of custom arose. So you could not make a statement to suit your claim in a forthcoming suit. The statement ought to have been an unguarded statement of opinion on a public right or custom and it ought to have been made before there was any controversy as to that public right or custom.  So you made the statement just before the institution of the suit, then that is not going to be admitted because you would have tailored it for that specific—and when we talk about a public right it is one which is held in common by all members of the public. For instance, when people are talking about a right of way in the form of a highway, people who would have know that right of way was there, a public right of way was there and it has to be one that affects a considerable portion of the community. For instance also when you talk about the boundary of a village. And remember that for it to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay over and above it having been made before there was a controversy, the person ought to be a person who can be considered as having competent knowledge, person likely to know.

Statements that relate to any relationship

The next exception is at subsection (e), which reads:

“When the statement relates to the existence of any relationship by blood, marriage, or adoption between persons as to whose relationship by blood, marriage or adoption the person making the statement had special means of knowledge, and when the statement was made before the question in dispute was raised;”

So essentially state of persons who cannot be called as witnesses will be admissible when they relate to the existence of any relationship. And the relationship could be a relationship by blood, by marriage or by adoption. And the person making the statement ought to have been a person who would have had special means of knowledge of the existence of that relationship. So it is not just any person. It is a person who had special means of knowledge. And remember again it is only in instances where that person cannot be called as a witness because of the variety of factors, that they are dead, cannot be found, etc.  And the statement must also have been made before there was a dispute as to the existence of the relationship or not. So there ought to have been an unguarded action.

And the case to look at here is the case of Seif Ali Bajkni and others v Hamed Bin Ali (1945) 7 Zanzibar LR 13. This involved a situation where a child was born 10 months after the marriage between the parents was dissolved. During the hearing it was sought to introduce a document concerning the relationship, written by the alleged father. The document was written in contemplation of the suit because the father disputed the parenthood and they made the document in the event that the child should ever file suit. If the child files suit against the father then the father would turn around and say there is a problem here, I do not accept that you are my son. So the document was written in contemplation of the suit because the father disputed his fatherhood of the child and the document contemplated a situation where the child might file any suit against the father.  And the court held that the document conclusively proved the existence of the controversy and it should be rejected. Because remember we said that the document ought to have be an unguarded assertion. It should not be one done in contemplation of a suit. The document itself conclusively proved the existence of the controversy at the time it is alleged to have been written because the father only wrote the document because they disputed their parenthood of the child. And they were writing it to guard themselves in the event that this child should ever fight it against the father. And so it should be rejected because the document ought to have been made when there was no dispute as to the existence of the relationship but you see here the father was dead but he had written the document. But he had only written the document for the purposes of establishing certain matters.


Statement relating to family affairs

The next exception is at (f), statements relating to family affairs. Those will also be admissible and these ought to be made by persons who would have knowledge, again. And they could also be on tombstones, family portraits, or other places where such statement should be made. It could also be in a will or a deed. So if you have a statement relating to family affairs in any of those places and it is made by a person who cannot be called as a witness, it would be accepted as an exception to the hearsay rule. And the assumption here is that there will be nobody inserting falsities in those kinds of places, where you are talking of a tombstone, a family portrait or a will or a deed. Those are solemn documents, so if you have those kinds of statements made by person who cannot be called as witnesses, there will be admissible.

Statements made by persons who cannot be called

Then at section 33 (g) where you have statements made by persons who cannot be called, which are contained in a deed or other transaction that establish a custom, those will be admitted. When a statement is contained in any deed or other documents which related to any such transaction as mentioned in section 13 (a). 13 (a) gave the establishment of customs or rights. Those would be admissible. And again here you are talking about statements that show when the custom or the right was created, when it was claimed, where it was modified, instances when it was recognized, or when it was asserted or denied. All these could be admissible if they are made by a person who cannot be called as a witness. And this provision includes private as well as public rights. So it is not just for public rights. It is also for private rights.

Statements made by several persons expressing feelings or impressions

And finally under section 33, statements made by several persons expressing feelings or impressions on their part, which are relevant to the issue in question. So if a number of people who cannot be called as witnesses had made statements expressing their feeling or impressions  which feelings or impressions are relevant to the matter in question, that is going to be admissible. For instance, if you have a number of people saying they were apprehensive, they had made statements to the effect that they were apprehensive that something was happening or that they got the impression that things were not being done in the way they should have been done. And again here of essence to admissibility is that they made them as unguarded statements. They are not tailor made for a specific procedure.