Monday, 29 September 2014

Slavery came and left. The logic of the ill and vile practice has however come to be of use not only to the understanding of employer’s liability under Tort Law, but also to the employees of low means’

By Quincy Kiptoo, Kavosa Assava, Alex Kaindo        
Introduction
The ambit of liability otherwise known as vicarious liability arises when one party is responsible for the torts of another. This situation occurs most frequently when an employer is held responsible for torts committed by an employee. Vicarious liability is a form of joint liability where both the person who committed the tort and their employer can be sued although in most cases it is the employer because they have the insurance.[1] Vicarious liability has certain three elements; Ratification, relation and abatement.
Ratification is agreement to accept the liability of the act of another. A person ratifying an act has to do so having full knowledge of that the act is tortious. There is a concept that there exists certain pre-conditions or pre-requisites whereby the person possessing vicarious liability is aware of the likelihood of occurrence of a tort or whereby the person is completely oblivious of the likelihood of a tortious act taking place. Assessment of the choice of the person committing the act needs to be done; there needs to be a correlation between the ratification of the act and the motive of why the act was committed.
Relation assumes pre-existing relationship between the person committing the act and the person liable for the act for example the Employer/employee; master/servant; company/director; principal/Agency relationships. The act for which we seek liability has to be a tortious act.
Under principle and agency, there are no specific rules with regards to vicarious liability. In order to establish liability under agency, it is important to point out under whose authority they were operating and to identify the terms of reference of this employee.  Directors of companies may become liable for the acts they have committed themselves or the ones they have directed their subordinates to commit. However this has to be for the overall benefit of the company. Under English law, in partnerships or firms, the firm or partnership becomes liable for the torts that have been committed by either of the partners in the course of doing business. In guardian/ minor no special liabilities apply for minors and their torts. It depends on to what extent were the guardians controlling or directing the tortious acts of the minors.
In the Master and Servant relationship, this is where employers’ liability comes in. Every act which is done by a servant in the cause of his employ is deemed to have been done under the master’s orders and is indeed considered the master’s own acts.[2] The master is vicariously liable for the acts of the servant. The question therefore is if it an absolute principle and whether the master will always be liable. The question of course of employment also arises where it is also important to identify whether the act occurred during the course of employment.
In the case of Short v. J. V. Henderson Ltd. (1946) TLR (HL) 420 the honorable judge stated that the question of extent of liability depended on the master’s power to give direction and to control the manner in which the work is being done. He further stated requirements that determine liability and they included; the master's power of selection of his servant; the payment of wages or other remuneration; the master's right to control the method of doing the work; and the master's right of suspension or dismissal." There is evolution whereby courts have come to conclude that control is not exclusive.
There is also the concept of contract of service and contract for services by an independent contractor. Independent contractors are directly liable for a tortious act and not their employers as opposed to employees under a contract of service whose degree of permanency causes the liability of a tort to lie on the employer. In the case of Stevenson v. Montreal Locomotive Ltd, there were four issues developed in order to distinguish between contract of service and contract for services by an independent contractor
1.    Have to look at who has wholesome control
2.    Who has the chance to profit/benefit
3.    Who owns or provides the tools
4.    The risk of loss
Another question we need to ask ourselves is whether the unauthorized act was not so connected with the authorized act as to be a way of performing the authorized act also known as the scope of employment. There is a need to identify the totality of what the employee is authorized to do. You can commit an unauthorized act that is considered as a mode or method of performing the authorized act.
Abatement is simply assisting another in committing a tort. In order to deal with the question effectively, this essay will first begin by explaining the contest of slavery to the law of tort and specifically vicarious liability and what this then means for those employees of low means.

History and Background of Slavery
Slavery is the state of bondage. It is the state of service. An institution of the conventional law of nations, by which one person is subjected to the dominion of another, contrary to natural right.[3] Slavery occurred along time ago and its origins started in Africa, where it was found that one indebted to the other would be subjected to work his way out of the debt if he does not have a means to pay up. With the coming of missionaries to Africa and the boosting of industries back home, this necessitated that they needed cheap labour if not free to work on their farms, and this necessitated the formation of the Trans-Atlantic Trade that forcibly embarked over twelve million Africans for transport to the Americas between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries[4] to Europe and the Americas.
Slaves were considered property under Roman law and had no legal personhood. Unlike Roman citizens, they could be subjected to corporal punishment, sexual exploitation (prostitutes were often slaves), torture, and summary execution. The testimony of a slave could not be accepted in a court of law unless the slave was tortured; a practice based on the belief that slaves in a position to be privy to their masters' affairs would be too virtuously loyal to reveal damaging evidence unless coerced[5]
Whereas elsewhere slave codes existed to bind the slaves to their masters and also to restrict their movement among many more restrictions, earlier on a wrong that was committed by a slave was not compensatory and in Cawthorne v Deas[6] the judge held that wrongs committed by slaves were as if they had been committed by natural elements such as air or fire hence there would be no compensation. But with the development of the notion of strict liability many argued that masters should be liable for their slaves wrongs, hence in Gaillardet v Demaries[7] where it was argued that a masters liability is the burden that he has to bear for owning such a species of property, it is absolute whether the slave is supposed to be acting on their authority or not. This liability could also be expressed in the sense that if the master would have disciplined his slave well then he slave would not have committed a tort hence the master was negligent in not ensuring the slaves behavior and conduct was top grade.
What emerged as a result of a slave being regarded as property was the master servant analogy this was preferable to treating slaves as cattle or dogs[8]. Slaves started being treated as servants but this was just a name to impose liability on their masters but the conditions of work were still the same. This doctrine had its problems as it was found that slaves and servants were not analogous.
The master servant doctrine of liability that is part of employers’ liability, was what emerged into the present day vicarious liability. In order for vicarious liability to apply the courts must ask two questions
     Was the person who committed the tort employed by the defendant?
     Was the tort committed in the course of that employment?
In relation to the first question, the two most important classes of persons for whose torts another person may be ultimately liable are employees and independent contractors. The general rule is that an employer is legally responsible for the negligence of his or her employees, but not for the negligence of an independent contractor. As with most broad legal principles, there are many exceptions. However, the general rule applies in most common circumstances.
A slave was an employee who worked on a forceful master servant relationship for life, this has stuck in modern times whereas employees are under a contract of service but not for life, an independent contractor is one who is hired under a contract for services, the two are often mistaken when it comes to employer’s liability. Certain tests have been brought out to distinguish between the two.

The control test.
In Short v J & W Henderson Ltd [9] Lord Thankerton stated that there were four indications of a contract of service; The master’s power of selection, if it is the master who chose the particular worker then this specific selection makes him/her an employee; The payment of remuneration, if the master personally pays remuneration to the worker then he or she is an employee; The masters right to control the method of doing the work, if the master can dictate the type of method that is to be followed then he or she is an employee; The masters right of suspension or dismissal, if it is the master who can suspend the worker then he or she is an employee. Control was found to be an inadequate indication for an employment contract hence this led to the to emergence of yet another test to cover up the inadequacy of control.
Organization/Integral test
This test asks whether the person’s work is an integral part of the business. A person employed to work on the till in a shop would usually be an employee. However, if the till was broken, the person called in to fix it would probably be an independent contractor, as his or her work would be incidental to the business of running the shop.
In Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison Ltd v Macdonald,[10] Lord denning stated about the integration test that ‘one feature seems to run through instances is that under a contract of service a man is employed as part of the business and his work is done as an integral part of the business; whereas under a contract for services, his work although done for the business, is not integrated into it but only as an accessory.
Economic reality test.
This is a more modern approach where the courts take a multiple factor approach; in this all aspects of the relationship are to be assessed. In Montreal v Montreal Locomotive works ltd [11] Lord Wright suggested that it is important to assess control, ownership of the tools of work and the chance of profit or a risk of loss. These three factors were also considered by judge Mackenna in Ready Mixed Concrete (south east) ltd v Ministers of pensions and national insurance.[12]
In the event of borrowing an employee sometimes an employee may be borrowed or on loan from another employee, the torts committed by this employee are generally vicariously liable by the original employee. This was decided in Mersey Docks and Harbor Board v Coggins & Griffith[13] where the harbor authority had loaned a crane plus the driver to a party, the crane driver negligently drove it and injured someone, the harbor authority were held liable in that the driver acted in the capacity and method that had been vested in him by the original employee hence the authority was held liable.
The House of Lords laid down a number of principles to be used in deciding future cases: The permanent employer would usually be considered liable, unless they can show good reason why responsibility should be placed on the employer who has borrowed the worker. In deciding whether there is good reason to place responsibility on the borrowing employer, a key question is who had the immediate right to control the employee’s method of working. Courts should identify the act which caused the negligence, and ask who had responsibility for preventing that act. Other important questions to consider were: who paid the worker: who had the right to dismiss him or her, and for how long was the employee borrowed? The terms of the contract between the two employers were not to be considered conclusive. On the facts of the case, the court concluded that the Harbor Board had not shown good reason for liability to be placed on Coggins & Griffith, and so the Board were held to be the crane driver’s employer.
The principles laid down in Mersey Docks were traditionally used to enable the courts to choose between two possible employers, so that one or the other would end up taking full responsibility. However, in Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd (2005), the Court of Appeal decided that in some cases it would be more appropriate to use those principles to share liability between two possible employers.[14] The claimants in the case owned a factory, where they were having some construction work done. During the work, a fitter’s mate, Mr. Strang, damaged the sprinkler system, causing a flood which damaged the property. The claimants had hired a company, Thermal Transfer, to do the work. Thermal Transfer had sub-contracted some jobs to a second company, Darwell, and a third company, CAT Metalwork, had supplied the fitter and his mate, Mr Strang, to Darwell. It was not in dispute that Viasystems had a claim against Thermal Transfers in contract, but they also sought to sue Darwell and CAT Metalwork in negligence, claiming they were vicariously liable for Mr. Strang. Mr. Strang under the instructions of, CAT Metalwork’s fitter, but both of them were under the supervision of a foreman employed by Darwell. The Court of Appeal found that both of them Darwell and CAT Metalwork, had the right and the responsibility to control the way Mr. Strang did his work, and so it was fair that both their companies were found to be vicariously liable for him. The Court held that both should contribute equally to the damages.[15]
Business on his own account’ Test
This is a growing test and was used by the Appeal court in the case of Hall v. Lorlmer.[16] This case was concerned with whether a freelance television technician for the purposes of tax law. As a self-employed technician he could pay less tax than if he was a permanent employee. The Inland Revenue argued that he was an employee because he was subject to the control of the television companies in that they told him where, when and for how long to work.
The Court of Appeal took a slightly different approach. They held that the crucial factor was that he was not in business on his own account. Workers will be viewed as in business on their own account if, for example, they provide their own equipment, take financial risks, hire helpers, have managerial and investment responsibilities, charge varying amounts for different jobs, send out invoices for their work and have quite a few clients.
Nolan LJ said in Hall v Lorlmer that just because people do highly-skilled work does not mean they are more likely to be self-employed, for a brain surgeon is usually an employee while a window cleaner is usually self-employed. Nor, in this day and age, does the fact that a person is on short-term contracts with different employers matter. He pointed out that the label that people give themselves is relevant but never decisive. He concluded that the ‘business on their own account’ test is not the exclusive test in deciding whether workers are employees.

Liability of the employer
As mentioned before, employer liability arises out of the Master and Servant relationship which is a principle that seeks to explain vicarious liability of employers for their employees. An employer will only be liable for torts that an employee commits in the course of employment. This is determined on the facts of each case. This may, at first, appear to be straightforward: as long as the tort was committed when the employee was doing his or her job, the employer is liable. Problems arise, however, when an employee was doing his or her job in an unauthorized manner or in a way expressly forbidden by the employer. The courts often struggle to determine what exactly the phrase ‘in the course of employment’ means, and there is no definitive test
The classic test is that of Salmond[17] which stated that tortious acts are done in the course of employment if they are:
     wrongful acts actually authorized by the employer, or
     wrongful and unauthorized ways of doing acts authorized by the employer also known as scope of employment
Salmonds method becomes irrelevant and unhelpful in cases of intentional wrongdoing particularly where the employee sets out to benefit himself. The esteemed worship H.M Okwengu in the case of Harun Thungu Wakaba and 20 others v the Attorney General held that the state is liable for the torture,both physical and psychological, inhuman, cruel and degrading acts that were carried out by state agents in this case the police. The state was forced to pay for their misconduct and violations of the people’s right not to be tortured.[18]
Hence Lord Steyn stated that the test for whether the employee has acted in the course of employment was whether the tort was so closely connected to his employment in that it would be fair and just to hold the employer vicariously liable.[19] Earlier on during slavery this connection was not needed and this is because since the slaves were always under the master’s authority for life then they were always within the course of their employment.
An employer will be vicariously liable for an employee’s tort when the employee has carried out an authorized act in a careless way. In Century Insurance Co v Northern Ireland Road Transport[20] while delivering petrol to garage, the driver was smoking a cigarette whilst petrol was flowing from the truck to an underground tank, he carelessly threw away the burning match and this caused an explosion. This act of smoking was an authorized act as it was not forbidden but he did it in a careless way hence his employers were held vicariously liable. The employer is also vicariously liable if he has allowed the employee to do an unlawful act or abated him to do a tortious act. Another instance in which the employer will be vicariously liable is if the employee has carried out an authorized act in an unauthorized way, in Poland v Parr[21], an off duty employee who suspecting that a boy would steal sugar from the cart, punched the boy and the boy got injured, the employers were held liable as the unauthorized way the authorized act was carried in to the benefit of the employer The last situation that can guarantee the employer being vicariously liable is when the employee has carried out an act that had been expressly forbidden but was for the benefit of the employer, in CPR v Lockhart,[22] an employee was allowed to use his personal car on outside jobs, provided that it had insurance, the privy council held that his employers despite this stipulation were liable for the damage he caused when he drove an uninsured car.
Employer’s indemnity
As vicarious liability means that two parties are held responsible for a tort, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 applies. This means that an employer found vicariously liable may, in turn, sue its employee to recover some or all of the damages awarded against it. Common law also allows the employer to recover damages from the employee in certain circumstances

Conclusion.
During days of slavery masters were held responsible for every tort there slaves committed as it was negligent on their part not to discipline them well and that is what resulted in them committing the torts in the 1st place. During this era employers are held liable for particular torts of their employees as they are seen as being negligent enough to not to hire efficient workers who are skilled well and do not commit torts during their course of employment.
The masters indemnity during those days of slavery was that he could sell off the slave, punish him or her physically or loan his or her out so that she can work to pay the damages she caused her or his master to pay. The employer’s indemnity gives employers a chance to sue their employees on damages caused but their torts, this may be through disciplinary action such as dismissal or giving the employee a chance to make the money lost.
The logic of the ill and vile practice has however come to be of use to employees of low means, this is evident in the event that slaves were generally low employees who were worth nothing if not very little, hence low employees for example nurses , if nurses commit a tort in the course of their employment it is not them that are sued primarily for reasons of vicarious liability but secondarily because they cannot pay in damages as much as the hospital can as the hospital has more money than them.



[1] Catherine Elliot and Francis Quinn, Tort Law, p 373
[2] Holmes, Common Law p 179-180
[2]
[3] Black’s Law dictionary, 5th edition, slavery/servitus
[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery_in_ancient_Rome
[6] 2 port 279 Alabama 1835
[7] 18 L.A 491 (1841)
[8] Southern Slavery and the Law 1619- 1860 by Thomas.D.Morris page 39
[9] 1946 62 T.L.R 427 at 429
[10] 1952 1 T.L.R 101 at 111
[11] 1947 D.L.R 161 at 169
[12] 1968 2 Q.B 497
[13] 1947 A.C 1
[14] Catherine Elliot and Francis Quinn, Tort Law, p 373
[15] Catherine Elliot and Francis Quinn, Tort Law, p 376-372
[16] AC 1992
[17] Salmond and Heuston on the law Torts 21st edition (1996) p 443
[18] 2010 Misc. app no. 1411(OS) 2004
[19] 2001 U.K.H.L 22.
[20] 1942 A.C 509
[21] 1927 1 K.B 366
[22] 1942 A.C 591

Workers Rights In a Global Economy

By Professor George Luchiri Wajackoyah
Ladies and Gentlemen,
This case questions the authority of Corporate entities and its treatment of workers rights
in its global operations. Many instances occur where corporate workers labor for long 
hours, poor conditions and peanut wages well below those imposed by International 
Treaties. They work in hazardous conditions,long hours,poor sanitation and poor 
housing and yet the host governments are not willing to regulate or impose or negotiate 
justice for her citizens.They fear contravening World Trade Organization (WTO), 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) and ramifications from its trading 
partners whose governments can simply cut off foreign aid. It is high time that these 
governments set legal standards in order to regulate and safeguard workers rights so that 
hazards such as the one I am going to address today are minimized. 
This lecture focuses on the unwillingness of the Union Carbide Corporation to pay 
compensation to factory workers who were killed by lethal gas leakage from its sister 
carbide plant in Bhopal, India. As we all know, this incident has raised not only issues of 
judicial concerns, but prompted an international environment crisis. The political 
establishment in India on the other hand has used the event to undermine Article One of 
the Indian Constitution which otherwise protects surberlitan rights of the Indian people. 
Instead, they abdicated their role and gave the Constitution a blind date. 
The Union Carbide, an American Corporation refused to submit to the Indian Courts and 
it is not known why the late Rajiv Gandhi hurriedly constituted the Indian Parliament and 
passed legislation mandating the government to stand in the shoes of the injured citizens 
when citizens were still agonizing with death and illness. They had standing, they had the 
right to choose counsel of their choice, the courts were there to arbitrate and the 
legislative assemblies were definitely interfering with the role of the judiciary and 
abridging the rights of its own citizens. The Union Carbide Corporate Officers defied 
summons to face charges in India and I would therefore like you to draw your own 
conclusions to this. The New York District Court on the other hand refused to hear the 
case for lack of jurisdiction and directed that the case be heard in Indian. 
The directors have refused to appear before Indian Courts besides the issuance of 
summons. It is not known whether the Indian government requested its U.S. counterparts 
to extradite the alleged officers face charges in India. Could this have been the reason as 
to why the Bhopal Act was passed? On the other hand, Mr. Anderson the then Corporate 
head lives happily in retirement in the United States. He has been exonerated from blame 
by the Indian Courts as we shall see later. Well, the question I pose to you is “what do 
you think would have happened had this disaster occurred here?”Did the Indian 
politicians abuse power when they passed the Bhopal Act?Did the Indian Judges in this 
case fault the Supreme Court ruling in Kerala v. Kesavananda, when they absolved Mr. 
Anderson from blame? 
Twenty two years ago, on the night of December 2, 1984, a deadly gas leak from Union 
Carbide’s facility killed at least 7,000 people in Bhopal, India. 
On the same day and around midnight, a massive leak of highly toxic MIC and other 
toxic chemical by-products spilled out from storage tank of the Union Carbide plant in 
Bhopal, blanketing the city for miles with a deadly white fog. Thousands were killed 
instantly from exposure to the gas as they slept or as they fled through the narrow alleys 
of the residential areas surrounding the plant. Hundreds of thousands were maimed and 
remain injured to this day. 
Hundreds of thousands continue to suffer from permanent disability and chronic illnesses 
as a result of exposure to Union Carbide’s toxic gases. This catastrophe in Bhopal has 
been called the "Hiroshima of the Chemical Industry", the worst peacetime industrial 
disaster in history compared only to September 11. 
Studies conducted by the Indian Council on Medical Research point out that the 
spontaneous abortion rate in Bhopal is 24.2 % or nearly three times the national average: 
the rate of stillborn infants is 26.1 per 1000 deliveries compared to an all-India rate of 7.9 
per 1000; and, even one year after the disaster, infant mortality in the city was around 110 
per 1000 births whereas the national average in India is 65.2 per thousand. 
THE HISTORY OF UNION CARBIDE 
1. In 1930, Union Carbide was implicated in America's worst industrial disaster, in the 
death of 700 men who died from acute silicosis while working on Union Carbide's 
Hawk's Nest Tunnel in the 1930s 
2. In 1984, while Union Carbide denied that its Bhopal plant had been built to less 
rigorous standards than its plant in Institute, (West Virginia); it also adamantly claimed 
that such an accident could not have happened at its facility in the U.S., thereby implying 
that Indian workers were entirely to blame.This claim stands "thoroughly rebutted by the 
fact that, even at its superior operation in Institute, there had been a series of gas leaks", 
of which 100 U.S workers were injured eight months after the Bhopal disaster, and 
indeed after the plant's safety features had been vastly improved. 
3. In January 1985, an internal Union Carbide report dated September 1984, three months 
before the Bhopal disaster, was brought to light: it warned that "a runaway reaction 
could occur in the MIC unit storage tanks"at Institute, and that "the planned 
response would not be timely or effective enough to prevent catastrophic failure of the 
tanks
4. Again, in April, 1986,Union Carbide was fined $1.4 million dollars for violating 
safety standards. 
5. A former UCIL employee in charge of the Indian operations had warned Union 
Carbide officials of the danger of storing very large quantities of MIC in enormous 
15,000-gallon tanks, and had recommended storage in smaller tanks, but he was 
"overridden by the parent corporation". 
6. Throughout, Union Carbide attempted to divest itself of any responsibility first by 
blaming Sikh extremists the "Black June" and second, alleged that the leakage was the 
work of a disgruntled employee. Judge Keenan dismissed this theory and Union Carbide 
Counsel never again whispered it. 
Actions were commenced in various courts in India. The Union Carbide did not show 
interest and action was brought in the US District court in New York. 
Civil Contempt Under 18 U.S.C. § 401. 
1. On May 12, 1986, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York dismissed, on grounds of forum non conveniens, actions arising from the Bhopal 
Disaster to which Defendant Union Carbide was a party. In Re: Union Carbide Corp. Gas 
Plant Disaster at Bhopal,India in December 1984, 634 F.Supp. 842, at 867 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986). The dismissal was conditioned upon Union Carbide’s agreement "to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of India."Further, the dismissal required that "Union 
Carbide shall agree to satisfy any judgment rendered by an Indian court, and if 
applicable, upheld by an appellate court in that country, where such judgment and 
affirmance comport with the minimal requirements of due process." 
2. Union Carbide should be held in contempt for their willful, intentional and 
flagrant disobedience of the orders of this Court requiring Union Carbide to submit 
to jurisdiction in India and to abide by the terms of any judgment rendered by the 
Indian courts. These orders were expressly agreed to by Union Carbide as a legal 
condition precedent to dismissal on forum non conveniens by Judge Keenan. By 
deliberately failing to obey the directives of the Supreme Court of India’s civil 
judgment in October 1991, Defendants violated these conditions to the extent that 
Union Carbide did not fully submit itself to the jurisdiction of Indian courts. 

THE INDIA’S SUPREME COURT’S RULING 
The Indian government hurriedly passed the Bhopal Act after the disaster, to become the 
sole legal representative of the victims. The government of India, led by the late Rajiv 
Gandhi, and in a deal brokered by the Supreme court of India, undertook a sudden 
turnabout without consulting the victims, and dropped all criminal charges against Union 
Carbide and settled for $470 million as "full and final" compensation--one sixth of the $3 
billion it had sought in damages. 
This not only denied the victims their constitutional rights of due process, but the right to 
choose his/her own legal representation. 
This settlement, blocked all civil and criminal proceedings, present as well as future, 
had ramifications beyond the victims' health and compensation.The legal immunity 
the settlement granted Union Carbide sets a precedent which limits victims' rights and 
eliminates an important tool for holding Multinational Corporations engaged in 
hazardous activities accountable for their actions. 
This decision was arrived at when half ofthe claimants had been medically examined, 
and barely 10 percent of those examined had the nature of their injuries categorized for 
the purpose of paying out compensation. 
While the "full and final" compensation was being worked out, one gas-exposed person 
was dying every day from gas- related injuries. Despite the lack of evidence to support its 
figures, the government of India convinced the Supreme Court that its count of 3,000 
dead and 102,000 injured (including minor and temporary as well  as severe and 
permanent injuries) was reasonable. 
The decision to set "fair" compensation at $470 million was based on those numbers. By 
June 1990, barely a year after the settlement, more claims had been examined and the 
official death toll had climbed to 3,787. 
The number of injured stood at 202,672--about twice the number on which the settlement 
was based. Close to 200,000 claims still remained to be examined. Caught in the legal political morass, the victims have not received the medical attention they need to tend to 
their worsening health. Six and a half years after the accident, the classic symptoms of 
what has come to be known as the "Bhopal Toxic Gas Disease" persist and, in some 
cases, are getting worse. 
Actual And Constructive Fraud
3. Despite repeated summons served upon Union Carbide through the U. S. 
Department of Justice as a result of letters rogatory issued by the Bhopal District 
Court, Union Carbide has willfully refused to submit to the lawful jurisdiction of 
India’s criminal courts. Further, the Bhopal District Court has served another 
summons upon the company’s officials through Interpol and published a notice to 
appear for trial in the Washington Post. In 1994, after repeated failures to appear 
for trial on the criminal charges pending against it, the Bhopal District Court 
ordered that Union Carbide be declared a "proclaimed absconder", a term of art in 
Indian law which is the equivalent of the term "fugitive from justice" in U.S. law. 
The Court also ordered the forfeiture of all of Union Carbide’s properties within 
India. 
Lawful process in the courts of India including, but not limited to, Union Carbide’s 
agreement to the forum dismissal conditions, as well as Union Carbide’s 
acknowledgment and acceptance of the Supreme Court of India’s judicial mandate 
regarding criminal proceedings. Further, the Defendants clearly had intent to 
deceive the victims by inducing them to accept terms and conditions of settlement 
with which Union Carbide had no intent to comply. 

Violation Of International Criminal Law Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350
4. Union Carbide’s conduct amounted to a violation of international criminal law which 
prohibits widespread or systematic killings or other inhumane acts perpetrated against a 
civilian population. 
5.Under this norm of international criminal law, and as evidenced by state practice in 
international and national prosecutions involving mistreatment of war prisoners and 
civilians, the term "murder" includes the creation of conditions likely to result in 
death if the culpable conduct rises to the level of common law manslaughter. Further, 
international law does not require that any nexus or connection between this norm of 
international criminal law and armed conflict of any kind whatsoever. Lastly, 
international law expressly provides for individual liability for this particular offense, 
even absent state action or any governmental involvement. 
6. Union Carbide had specific knowledge that MIC is an extremely volatile and 
highly dangerous chemical substance.Union Carbide’s conduct in failing to design, 
construct, maintain and operate a safe plant exposed the people of Bhopal in its environs 
to a grave risk of serious harm and/or death which was foreseeable and which Union 
Carbide knew might occur. Union Carbide caused to be implemented, directed and 
supervised a deliberate policy of double standards in the design, operation, of safety 
facilities and emergency-preparedness of its UCIL plant when compared to the plant in 
Institute, West Virginia. Union Carbide directed, supervised, controlled and/or caused to 
be implemented a specific policy of cost-cutting which resulted in the UCIL facility 
operating on a subsistence basis,thereby creating conditions that could foreseeably result 
in widespread death and serious physical injury to victims and other Class members. 
7.As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Union Carbide,numerous thousands 
of class members, including the Plaintiffs, suffered agonizing, lingering and excruciating 
deaths, serious and permanent injuries, including but not limited to, acute respiratory 
distress syndrome, ocular and gastro intestinal injuries, and pain, suffering and emotional 
distress of immense, continuing proportion. The survivors, who experienced an 
unimaginable and unforgettable catastrophe, witnessing the virtual destruction of 
their families and entire communities, have suffered and will continue to suffer 
severe psychological distress. Further injuries to such  persons through the 
manifestation of illnesses, and to generations not yet born, are reasonably certain to 
occur in the future. As a further direct and proximate result of Union Carbide’s conduct, 
the families and relatives of the dead have suffered, and will continue to suffer, from the 
loss of support, aid, comfort, society and companionship of the deceased. Finally, as 
another direct and proximate result of Union Carbide’s conduct, numerous Plaintiffs and 
Class members have lost personal income, are unable to work as a result of their injuries 
and have been reduced to penury. 

Racial Discrimination In Violation Of International Law Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350
8. The Union Carbide acts were the direct consequence of Union Carbide's 
deliberate policy of systematic racial discrimination against Indians, which took 
place under color of law and actual or apparent authority within the meaning of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 because Union Carbide acted as a joint venture with the Union of 
India which held a direct financial stake in the UCIL facility. 
9. Customary international law not only prohibits racial discrimination, but the norm rises 
to the level of a jus cogens prohibition. The International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("ICERD") defines racial discrimination in 
Article 1 as "any distinction, exclusion,restriction or preference based on race, 
color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Further, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a party, prohibits all acts of state 
discrimination, not just systematically discriminatory policies. 
Cruel, Inhuman And Degrading Treatment Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350
10.The intentional and outrageous conduct of Union Carbide had the effect of 
grossly debasing the value of life of class members including the victims and 
subjecting them to extreme humiliation by directing policies based on contempt of 
their very existence. As a result of Union Carbide's inhumane actions, many of the 
victims of the Bhopal Gas Disaster have undergone excruciating deaths, while many 
of those who have survived the Disaster have been forced to live in penury and to 
suffer debilitating illnesses without medical attention. 
11. Union Carbide's conduct resulted directly, through permanent or lasting defects to the 
victims' chromosomal structure, or through birth defects or neurological illness which are 
the result of exposure of class members including the victims to toxic chemicals, in 
derogation at the most fundamental possible level of the inherent, basic human rights 
guaranteed by customary international law. By Union Carbide's acts, victims have been 
fundamentally harmed in their persons and forced to experience genetic defects, 
congenital abnormalities, mental disorders and illness of various kinds that affect their 
most basic integrity as human individuals.

Violation Of The Rights To Life, Health And Security Of The Person Under 28 U.S.C. § 
1350
12. The right to life is the most fundamental of human rights and has been widely 
recognized as a non-derogable norm of customary international law in almost every 
international instrument. Without question, therefore, this right is both universal 
and obligatory under international law. The right to life is specifically applicable to 
cases involving severe environmental harm. For example, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee has expressly ruled that a complaint alleging large-scale 
dumping of nuclear waste which threatened the lives of local residents stated a 
prima facie case for a violation of the right to life under Article 6(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
13. A wide variety of international instruments including, but not limited to, the 
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR")(art. 12), 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 25), the African Charter (art. 16), the 
American Declaration (art. XI),the Rights of the Child Convention (art. 24), contribute to 
the consensus that the right to health constitutes a peremptory norm of customary 
international law. The ICESCR, the Vienna Declaration and the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission have all found environmental destruction and pollution to threaten the right 
to life and/or health is cognizable violations of international law. 
14. Union Carbide’s unlawful conduct violated the citizens’ fundamental human rights 
including the following: right to life, health and security of the person as guaranteed in 
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the Universal 
Declaration which provides that "all are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration." Further, Union Carbide’s conduct 
violated Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which 
states "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life" and Article 9(1) of the Covenant 
which expressly recognizes the right to security of the person. Since these treaties and 
conventions are declaratory of customary international law, Victims assert the violation 
of these rights as violations of the peremptory norms of the law of nations. 
Violations Of International Environmental Law Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350
15. International law, as evidenced by a number of widely adopted international 
instruments, has recognized a minimum right to a safe environment as a customary norm. 
In the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 114 nations declared 
that"[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of 
life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well being, and he 
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and 
future generations." In the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 178 
states affirmed in Principle 1 that human beings "are entitled to a healthy and 
productive life in harmony with nature." Article 11(1) of the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights, for example, provides that "everyone shall have 
the right to live in a healthy environment." 
16. The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Principle 21, establishes under international law "the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the national jurisdiction." In the Convention on the 
Trans boundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, the Preamble cites Principle 21 of the 
Declaration as well as the "polluter-pays principle as a general principle of international 
environmental law." Further, the Convention provides, as an instrument "underlining the 
principles of international law and custom," that the Parties to the Convention such as the 
United States "shall, in accordance with their legal systems… provide natural or legal 
persons who are being or are capable of being adversely affected by the trans boundary 
effects of an industrial accident in the territory of a Party, with access to, and treatment in 
the relevant administrative and judicial proceedings, including the possibilities of starting 
a legal action and appealing a decision affecting their rights, equivalent to those available 
to persons within their own jurisdiction." 
17. Both international practice and domestic custom support the universal and obligatory 
nature of an international legal norm prohibiting widespread, severe and long-term 
environmental harm that threatens internationally recognized rights to life, health and 
security of the person. In total, states have adopted some 350 multilateral treaties and 
1,000 bilateral treaties protecting the environment. In domestic legal systems, an 
obligation to protect the environment or the right to a safe environment is enshrined in the 
constitutions of approximately 60 nations. Therefore, at a minimum, customary 
international law provides that large-scale environmental harm which threatens the right 
to life and security of the person constitutes a violation of its jus cogens. 
18. As a result of Union Carbide's conduct, victims rights under international 
environmental law were violated by the introduction of toxic chemicals and other 
waste materials from the leak of MIC into the city of Bhopal. This contamination 
continues to this day to pollute the Plaintiffs' environment and habitations in water, 
livestock, agricultural products, soil and air,in violation of customary international 
law regarding protection of the human environment. 

Consistent Pattern Of Gross Violations Of Human Rights Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350
19. Customary international law, which forbids even a single violation of its fundamental 
rights and peremptory norms, such as the right to life, also provides that a separately 
cognizable violation may be based on an aggregation of such violations. International law 
prohibits a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights perpetrated under color of law. Where, as here, the violations in question are 
repeated and/or severe enough to give rise to numerous claims, the Alien Tort 
Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 1350) provides that the conduct in question may be 
actionable as a "consistent pattern." According to the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law, this norm forbids "infringements of recognized human 
rights that are not violations when committed singly or sporadically." 
20.Union Carbide’s conduct, amounted to a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
recognized human rights insofar as Union Carbide operated and maintained a plant in 
Bhopal, India which continuously posed a grave risk of death and/or serious physical 
injury to the surrounding population; that  each incident manifesting its depraved 
indifference to the grave risks posed to that population amounted to a violation of 
recognized human rights to life, health and security of the person; that there were several, 
repeated incidents of such toxic leakage which injured workers and hundreds of nearby 
residents; and that Union Carbide on each occasion ignored the grave risk of death and 
serious physical injury posed by its facility in Bhopal. In addition, Union Carbide’s 
conduct after the Bhopal gas disaster demonstrates a consistent pattern of gross violations 
of recognized human rights because of its failure to provide adequate information about 
MIC to those treating the victims, including, but not limited to, Union Carbide’s failure to 
disclose any information on the medical consequences, toxicity or ultra hazardous 
character of MIC prior to and after the occurrence of the Disaster. Further, Union 
Carbide’s purposeful absconding from the criminal jurisdiction of India’s courts 
also represents a continuous, ongoing violation of the Plaintiffs' right to a remedy at 
law in violation of customary international law, as embodied in Article 8 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that "everyone has the right to 
an effective remedy by the competent national tribunal for acts violating the 
fundamental rights guaranteed to him by constitution or by law" and Article 2(3) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

CONCLUSION
21. Union Carbide owed a duty to Bhopal victims and the class to exercise reasonable 
care in designing, operating and maintaining the UCIL facility as well as in 
manufacturing the pesticides produced therein and disposing of them properly in 
connection with their manufacture. 
22. Union Carbide breached its duty of care by engaging in the negligent manufacture 
and disposal of pesticides, chemicals and toxic effluents which contaminated the land and 
soil around its facility in Bhopal prior to the Bhopal Disaster and by otherwise failing to 
employ safe, prudent and technologically current techniques to prevent the discharge 
toxic chemicals, effluents and other by-products into the environment. 
23. Union Carbide was negligent in one, someand/or all of the following respects: in 
using technology inadequate for the manufacture of pesticides and disposal of 
chemical by-products of thatprocess; in failing to utilize proper technology and 
disposal mechanisms to prevent the contamination of the environment surrounding its 
Bhopal facility with pesticides, toxic chemicals and its by-products; in failing to exercise 
due care in the manufacture and disposal of its chemical products; in failing to prevent 
spills, discharges and other leaks of pesticides, toxic effluents and chemical by-products; 
in failing to warn the inhabitants of the residential communities surrounding its Bhopal 
facility of the toxicity of the chemicals manufactured therein; in failing to take reasonable 
precautions or exercise reasonable care to publish, adopt and enforce safe methods of 
disposal of its pesticides, toxic chemicals and chemical by-products; in failing to 
disclose to victims and the Class medical research and tests conducted by them on 
the toxicity of the products released by Union Carbide. into the environment; in 
failing to test all chemical products released into the environment for adverse health 
effects, or to cause said products to be tested; in concealing from victims 
information concerning the effects of such products in humans and animals; in 
failing to adequately monitor the health of victims exposed to toxic chemicals, 
pesticides or its chemical by-products. 
24. Union Carbide’s breach of duty was wanton, outrageous, reckless and intentional. 
Union Carbide made the decision for its own economic gain to dump chemical byproducts and toxic effluents from its manufacture of pesticides into the environment, and 
thereby to expose victims and the Class to toxic chemicals including, but not limited to, 
benzene, lead, mercury, hydrocarbons and other toxins, knowing that such substances 
were toxic to humans. 
Public Nuisance
25.Union Carbide’s conduct and the resulting contamination of the environment in and 
around its pesticide-manufacturing facility in Bhopal has created a public nuisance which 
endangers and will continue for many years to endanger the safety, health and comfort of 
a large number of persons. This contamination has been scientifically determined to be 
unrelated to the release of toxic chemicals from the UCIL facility on December 2-3, 
1984, but has affected the same Class of individuals who were exposed to Union 
Carbide’s toxic chemicals as a result of the Bhopal Disaster, exacerbating the harm, 
physical injury and severe damage to health caused by that incident. 
Thank you.